USA v. ARIZONA - THE SB1070 CASE ON APPEAL - PART THREE

S.B. 1070 Section 3 provides: “In addition to any violation of federal law, a person is guilty of willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 United States Code section 1304(e) or 1306(a).”15 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1509(A) (2010). The penalty for violating Section 3 is a maximum fine of one hundred dollars, a maximum of twenty days in jail for a first violation, and a maximum of thirty days in jail for subsequent violations. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1509(H). Section 3 “does not apply to a person who maintains authorization from the federal government to remain in the United States.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1509(F) (2010). Section 3 essentially makes it a state crime for unauthorized immigrants to violate federal registration laws.

Judge Paez's opening volley on §3 refutes any presumption against preemption because enforcing immigration laws is not an area traditionally occupied by the States. That means the presumption safeguarding the historic police powers of the States does not apply.

Judge Paez next engages in statutory interpretation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1306. Paez writes: "These sections create a comprehensive scheme for immigrant registration, including penalties for failure to carry one’s registration document at all times, 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e), and penalties for willful failure to register, failure to notify change of address, fraudulent statements, and counterfeiting. 8 U.S.C. § 1306 (a)-(d). These provisions include no mention of state participation in the registration scheme. By contrast, Congress provided very specific directions for state participation in 8 U.S.C. § 1357, demonstrating that it knew how to ask for help where it wanted help; it did not do so in the registration scheme."

Dismantling the intellectual sleight of hand apparently devised by SB 1070's brain trust, Kris Kobach, Judge Paez exposes the weakness of Arizona's legal argument.

Arizona was arguing that §3 was not preempted because Congress had invited the participation of the States in the general scheme of immigration enforcement.

Paez writes "Congress has expressly indicated how and under what conditions States should help the federal government in immigration regulation. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621-25, 1324a(h)(2).

The sections Arizona cites authorize states to limit certain immigrants’ eligibility for benefits and to impose sanctions on employers who employ unauthorized immigrants." Paez noted that Congress did not intend for the States to engage in the enforcement or punishment of federal immigration registration rules. Paez is not letting Arizona get away with Kobach's clever argument of usurping authority from one specific section of the INA and applying it generally to all sections of the INA.

Paez strikes at the heart of Arizona's Kobachian weakness by pointing out that which a Professor of Constitutional Law should be aware, rulings of the Supreme Court.

Paez says "S.B. 1070 Section 3 plainly stands in opposition to the Supreme Court’s direction: “where the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67.

In Hines, the Court considered the preemptive effect of a precursor to the INA, but the Court’s language speaks in general terms about “a complete scheme of regulation,” — as to registration, documentation, and possession of proof thereof — which the INA certainly contains. Section 3’s state punishment for federal registration violations fits within the Supreme Court’s very broad description of proscribed state action in this area—which includes “complementing” and “enforcing additional or auxiliary regulations."

Paez next takes Arizona to school by citing cases where preemption does or does not apply and Paez is kind enough to teach Arizona why the results are reached.

The Critical Element Standard

Beginning with Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) Paez notes that the Supreme Court held that the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) conflict preempted a state law fraud claim against defendants who allegedly made misrepresentations to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 531 U.S. at 343. The Court explained that private parties could not assert state-fraud on the FDA claims because, “the existence of the federal enactments is a critical element in their case.” The same principle applies here to S.B. 1070 Section 3, which makes the substantive INA registration requirements “a critical element” of the state law.

The Generality or Wider Application Standard

Paez discusses a line of cases where the State laws were not preempted by the Federal Statute. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) where the Supreme Court held that an express preemption provision in the Federal Medical Device Amendments to the FDCA did not preclude a state common law negligence action against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective medical device. The State Law was predicated on a theory of negligence.

In Altria Group., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) the Supreme Court held that the federal Labeling Act did not expressly preempt plaintiffs’ claims under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act alleging that Altria’s advertising of light cigarettes was fraudulent. The State Law was predicated on a theory of unfair business practices.

In Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95 (2009) the Supreme Court held that the FDA’s drug labeling judgments pursuant to the FDCA did not obstacle preempt State Law products liability claims. Obstacle preemption exists where under the circumstances of a particular case, the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.

Paez makes the distinction between the cases he cited and SB 1070. "All of the state laws at issue in these cases had significantly wider applications than the federal statutes that the Court found did not preempt them. Here, however, Section 3’s “generality” has no wider application than the INA."

Like Section 2(b), Section 3 fails because of its detrimental effect on foreign affairs, and its potential to lead to 50 different state immigration schemes piling on top of the federal scheme. Paez's majority opinion found that the inconceivable standard had been met, that the United States was likely to succeed on the merits of their case and that Judge Bolton did not abuse her discretion.

Part Three of this series will discuss Judge Paez's majority opinion and Section 5(c) of SB1070.

USA v. ARIZONA - THE SB1070 CASE ON APPEAL - PART TWO

Judge Paez's section by section analysis of the enjoined sections of Arizona's SB 1070 began with section 2(b).

S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) provides, in the first sentence, that when officers have reasonable suspicion that someone they have lawfully stopped, detained, or arrested is an unauthorized immigrant, they “shall” make “a reasonable attempt . . .when practicable, to determine the immigration status” of the person. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2010).

Section 2(B)’s second and third sentences provide that “any person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before the person is released,” and “the person’s immigration status shall be verified with the federal government.” 

The Section’s fifth sentence states that a “person is presumed to not be an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States if the person provides” a form of identification included in a prescribed list.

Arizona argues that its officers are only required to verify the immigration status of an arrested person before release if reasonable suspicion exists that the person lacks proper documentation. Paez refutes Arizona's argument by employing statutory analysis.

On its face, Paez writes, the text does not support Arizona’s reading of Section 2(B). The second sentence is unambiguous: “Any person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before the person is released.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2010). 

The all encompassing “any person,” the mandatory “shall,” and the definite “determined,” make this provision incompatible with the first sentence’s qualified “reasonable attempt . . . when practicable,” and qualified “reasonable suspicion.” In addition, the opinion says, Arizona’s reading creates irreconcilable confusion as to the meaning of the third and fifth sentences.

The Ninth Circuit agrees with the district court that the reasonable suspicion requirement in the first sentence does not modify the plain meaning of the second sentence. Thus, Section 2(B) requires officers to verify — with the federal government — the immigration status of all arrestees before they are released, regardless of whether or not reasonable suspicion exists that the arrestee is an undocumented immigrant.

The Ninth Circuit is required to determine the purpose of Congress and then determine if the Congress legislated in an area typically and traditionally occupied by the States. The Ninth Circuit concluded that The states have not traditionally occupied the field of identifying immigration violations so they did not apply a presumption against preemption for Section 2(B).

Paez began his inquiry into Congressional purpose by focusing on 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) of the INA. That section is titled "Performance of immigration officer functions by State officers and employees.”

Congress, Paez says, has instructed under what conditions state officials are permitted to assist the Executive in the enforcement of immigration laws. Congress has provided that the Attorney General “may enter into a written agreement with a State . . . pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State . . . who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States . . . may carry out such function.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1). Subsection (g)(3) provides that “in performing a function under this subsection, an officer . . . of a State . . . shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3). Subsection (g)(5) requires that the written agreement must specify “the specific powers and duties that may be, or are required to be, exercised or performed by the individual, the duration of the authority of the individual, and the position of the agency of the Attorney General who is required to supervise and direct the individual .”

The provisions of the INA, according to Paez, demonstrate that Congress intended for states to be involved in the enforcement of immigration laws under the Attorney General’s close supervision. Not only must the Attorney General approve of each individual state officer, he or she must delineate which functions each individual officer is permitted to perform.

The Court of Appeals interprets subsection (g)(10)(B) to mean that when the Attorney General calls upon state and local law enforcement officers—or such officers are confronted with the necessity—to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement on an incidental and as needed basis, state and local officers are permitted to provide this cooperative help without the written agreements that are required for systematic and routine cooperation.

Similarly, the Court of Appeals interprets subsection (g)(10)(A) to mean that state officers can communicate with the Attorney General about immigration status information that they obtain or need in the performance of their regular state duties. But subsection (g)(10)(A) does not permit states to adopt laws dictating how and when state and local officers must communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of an individual. Subsection (g)(10) does not exist in a vacuum, Paez writes; Congress enacted it alongside subsections (g)(1)-(9) and we therefore interpret subsection (g)(10) as part of a whole, not as an isolated provision with a meaning that is unencumbered by the other constituent parts of § 1357(g).9

Delivering the bottom line Paez writes that in sum, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) demonstrates that Congress intended for state officers to systematically aid in immigration enforcement only under the close supervision of the Attorney General — to whom Congress granted discretion in determining the precise conditions and direction of each state officer’s assistance.

The Court of Appeals found it particularly significant for the purposes of the present case that this discretion includes the Attorney General’s ability to make an individual officer’s immigration enforcement duties permissive or mandatory. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(5).

Arizona's SB1070 Section 2(B) sidesteps Congress’ scheme for permitting the states to assist the federal government with immigration enforcement. Through Section 2(B), Arizona has enacted a mandatory and systematic scheme that conflicts with Congress’ explicit requirement that in the “performance of immigration officer functions by State officers and employees,” such officers “shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3). Section 2(B) therefore interferes with Congress’ scheme because Arizona has assumed a role in directing its officers how to enforce the INA.

The Court of Appeals is not aware of any INA provision demonstrating that Congress intended to permit states to usurp the Attorney General’s role in directing state enforcement of federal immigration laws.

Arizona argues that in another INA provision, “Congress has expressed a clear intent to encourage the assistance from state and local law enforcement officers,” citing 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). That section, Paez writes, creates an obligation, on the part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to “respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual . . . for any purpose authorized by law.”

The Court of Appeals agree that § 1373(c) demonstrates that Congress contemplated state assistance in the identification of undocumented immigrants. We add, however, that Congress contemplated this assistance within the boundaries established in § 1357(g), not in a manner dictated by a state law that furthers a state immigration policy.

The Heart of the Ruling

The Ninth Circuit finds ample rationale for applying the federal preemption doctrine. Paez writes that by imposing mandatory obligations on state and local officers, Arizona interferes with the federal government’s authority to implement its priorities and strategies in law enforcement, turning Arizona officers into state-directed DHS agents. As a result, Section 2(B) interferes with Congress’ delegation of discretion to the Executive branch in enforcing the INA.

S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” as expressed in the aforementioned INA provisions. The law subverts Congress’ intent that systematic state immigration enforcement will occur under the direction and close supervision of the Attorney General. Furthermore, the mandatory nature of Section 2(B)’s immigration status checks is inconsistent with the discretion Congress vested in the Attorney General to supervise and direct State officers in their immigration work according to federally-determined priorities.

In addition to Section 2(B) standing as an obstacle to Congress’ statutorily expressed intent, the record unmistakably demonstrates that S.B. 1070 has had a deleterious effect on the United States’ foreign relations, which weighs in favor of preemption. See generally Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (finding obstacle preemption where a State law impinged on the Executive’s authority to singularly control foreign affairs); Crosby, 530 U.S. 363 (same). In Garamendi, the Court stated that “even . . . the likelihood that state legislation will produce something more than incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the National government would require preemption of the state law.”

Actual Foreign Policy Problems

The record before this court demonstrates that S.B. 1070 does not threaten a “likelihood . . . [of] producing] something more than incidental effect;” rather, Arizona’s law has created actual foreign policy problems of a magnitude far greater than incidental. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 (emphasis added). Thus far, the following foreign leaders and bodies have publicly criticized Arizona’s law: The Presidents of Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala; the governments of Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and Nicaragua; the national assemblies in Ecuador and Nicaragua and the Central American Parliament; six human rights experts at the United Nations; the Secretary General and many permanent representatives of the Organization of American States; the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; and the Union of South American Nations.

In addition to criticizing S.B. 1070, Mexico has taken affirmative steps to protest it. As a direct result of the Arizona law, at least five of the six Mexican Governors invited to travel to Phoenix to participate in the September 8-10, 2010 U.S. - Mexico Border Governors’ Conference declined the invitation. The Mexican Senate has postponed review of a U.S.-Mexico agreement on emergency management cooperation to deal with natural disasters.

Relying on the record, and testimony from Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg, the Ninth Circuit found that these factors persuade us that Section 2(B) thwarts the Executive’s ability to singularly manage the spillover effects of the nation’s immigration laws on foreign affairs.

Finally, Paez writes, the threat of 50 states layering their own immigration enforcement rules on top of the INA also weighs in favor of preemption. The Court of Appeals cites Hines v. Davidowitz on this point:

The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective

interests of the forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and exclusive

responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties.

“For local interests the several states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.” Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the United States has met its burden to show that there is likely no set of circumstances under which S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) would be valid, and it is likely to succeed on the merits of its challenge. That's the inconceivable standard, it is inconceivable that any application of SB 1070 passes Constitutional muster. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding the same.

Part Three of this series will focus on Judge Paez's analysis of Section 3 of SB1070.

JERRY MORAN, LYNN JENKINS, & DAN BURTON HAVE GOT THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE WRONG - USA v. ARIZONA, THE SB 1070 CASE

Kansas' Republican Senator-elect Jerry Moran, Second District Representative Lynn Jenkins, and Indiana's Fifth District Republican Dan Burton weighed in to the Arizona SB 1070 with an amicus curiae brief. They joined the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF), the Allied Educational Foundation (AEF), Concerned Citizens and Friends of Illegal Immigration Law Enforcement (CCFILE) [ § 501 (c) (3) organizations], and the National Border Patrol Council (NBPC) [ a § 501 (c) (5) organization.].

Their opening volley is that the federal government's failure to establish a "pervasive" scheme as to employing illegal immigrants means that preemption cannot apply. It is one of the weaker arguments I have read in the many briefs competing for the attention of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Take another case which employs the "pervasive" standard, Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, 76 F.3d 778, which was decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal in 1996. This is an aviation noise case from Michigan. Explaining when a statute may be preemptive, the Sixth Circuit said:

"A statute may be construed as preemptive under three circumstances.... First, Congress, in enacting a federal statute, may express a clear intent to preempt state law. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Common, 461 US. 190, 203 (1983). Second, absent express preemption, federal law may have an implied preemptive effect if Congress revealed this intent by "occupying the field" of regulation. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984). There is implied preemption when there is a "scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it" or "because the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn, 458 US. at 153. There is a third type of preemption when state law actually conflicts with federal law. Such conflict occurs where "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, (1941)."

The Hines case is the most important one to focus on because Judge Bolton relied on the case for as precedent and because it speaks directly to the topic which these Amici argue.

The current SB 1070 case on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, U.S.A. v. Arizona, is almost like an echo of the Hines case. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted an Alien Registration Act in 1939. That law required everyone over the age of 18 to "to register once each year; provide such information as is required by the statute, plus any:

other information and details "that the Department of Labor and Industry may direct; pay $1 as an annual registration fee; receive an alien identification card and carry it at all times; show the card whenever it may be demanded by any police officer or any agent of the Department of Labor and Industry; and exhibit the card as a condition precedent to registering a motor vehicle in his name or obtaining a license to operate one. The Department of Labor and Industry is charged with the duties of classifying the registrations for "the purpose of ready reference," and furnishing a copy of the classification to the Pennsylvania Motor Police. Nonexempt aliens who fail to register are subject to a fine of notmore than $100 or imprisonment for not more than 60 days, or both. For failure to carry an identification card or for failure to show it upon proper demand, the punishment is a fine of not more than $10, or imprisonment for not more than 10 days, or both.

In short, this statute was an earlier version of Arizona's papers please SB 1070 law.

What Moran, Jenkins, Burton, and their tax-exempt cohorts fail to recognize in their brief is that the Constitution gives the Congress absolute authority to regulate in the arena of immigration. Had their learned counsel fully read Hines, instead of picking and ignoring selected text, perhaps they wouldn't have found themselves out on the proverbial limb. What they want is for the Ninth Circuit to agree that this case is about an area where either the federal government or the states may regulate and ignore that silly old Constitution.

The Hines court went on to say:

Our conclusion is that appellee is correct in his contention that the power to restrict, limit, regulate, and register aliens as a distinct group is not an equal and continuously existing concurrent power of state and nation, but that whatever power a state may have is subordinate to supreme national law. We proceed therefore to an examination of Congressional enactments to ascertain whether or not Congress has acted in such manner that its action should preclude enforcement of Pennsylvania's law.

In Hines the Supreme Court found that Pennsylvania Act could not be enforced. In finding that the United States is likely to succeed on the merits of the case, Judge Bolton said, in part, that SB 1070 "is likely to burden legally-present aliens, in contravention of the Supreme Court’s directive in Hines that aliens not be subject to “the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance.” [citing Hines.] ... Further, the number of requests that will emanate from Arizona as a result of determining the status of every arrestee is likely to impermissibly burden federal resources and redirect federal agencies away from the priorities they have established."

Judge Bolton added the following footnote 7:

The problems associated with burdening federal resources are even more acute when considered in light of other state laws similar to this provision. (See Pl.’s Mot. at 31-32 (citing to a newspaper article stating that at least 18 other states are considering parallel legislation).); see also North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 458-59 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in plurality opinion in part and dissenting in part) (collecting cases where burden of state regulation on federal government was amplified by aggregate potential of multiple states following suit).

While it is clear that the Constitution gives the federal government sole authority over immigration Congress may invite the assistance of the States in the enforcement of those laws. That is essentially the argument made by SB 1070's author Secretary of State-elect Kris Kobach. What Kobach and the SB 1070 brain trust overlooked was the permissive nature of that cooperation. In a classic case of being offered an inch and taking a mile the Kobachian version is that when Congress opened the door to the States then all bets were off. You'd think a guy like Kobach would have a greater understanding of Constitutional Law than to come up with that goofy notion.

Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus was a different sort of case from either Hines or U.S.A. v. Arizona. The latter two cases directly involved an area which the Constitution says the federal government has supreme control, but in Gustafson the Sixth Circuit said: "[W]e believe the United States' sovereign regulation of the airspace over the United States and the regulation of aircraft in flight is distinguishable from the regulation of the designation of plane landing sites, which involves local control of land (or, in the present case, water) use."

There are three ways in which the preemption doctrine can apply. First is the case of express preemptions, where " . . . Congressional intent to preempt must be unambiguous and cannot be inferred from (the) mere fact that (the) federal statute is detailed and complex or because state legislation touches an area of predominantly national concern." Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, (9th Cir. 1981) 659 F.2d 903.

Second is the case of implied preemptions, where ". . . When a federal statute does not explicitly prohibit state regulation in the same field, congressional intent to preempt may be inferred from nature of federal regulatory scheme or from subject matter being regulated . . . (Pacific Legal Foundation).

" . . in a preemption test the fundamental inquiry is whether local legislation will conflict with national policy . . .; if the activity is of predominantly local interest then state action may be permissible, but if a uniform national rule is necessary then federal preemption will be implied." California v. Zook, (1949) 336 U.S. 725, 728.

The third case is where the state law conflicts with federal law. This is where the instant case belongs. " . . . a conflict between state and federal law . . may arise when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67, as cited in Ogden Environmental Services v. City of San Diego, 88 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15264, 15266-15267.

" . . . Even if Congress did not intend to preempt all state legislation in a given field, a state law must be held invalid to (the) extent that it actually conflicts with federal law . . . (Pacific Legal Foundation, supra.).

" . . . State regulations are preempted when a conflict would arise if compliance with both federal and state regulations were impossible or if state regulations stood as an obstacle to achievement of congressional objectives . . . (Pacific Legal Foundation, supra.).

Moran, Jenkins, and Burton are trying to lead the Ninth Circuit down the wrong path, that of express preemption. They seem unable to reconcile themselves to the fact that the Constitution places this case in the third area, that of conflicts.

They will not win their point in an appellate court. The question remains if in the 112th Congress they will try to grant the States the power to regulate in the field of immigration. There is no way the President would sign a bill like that. It would, however, set up another interesting legal battle, the intentional abdication of federal responsibility by Congress. In other words, can Congress, by statute, let the States regulate where the Constitution says the States may not regulate?

Yes, Virginia, we seem to be returning to the Articles of Confederation. And no, Virginia, they didn't work so well before.