Christine O'Donnell, the Separations of Powers Doctrine, and Nino Scalia

With the stubbornness of a child, Christine O'Donnell appears to lack the capacity to apply reason and logic to issues of constitutional law. This week O'Donnell asked her Democratic opponent for Delaware's Senate Seat where in the Constitution can separation of church and state be found.

Ms. O'Donnell's timing couldn't have been worse. The debate was held at the Widener School of Law. When O'Donnell asked Chris Coons the fatal question the audience responded with laughter and dismay.

Christine O'Donnell comes from that silly school of constitutional interpretation that says if those exact specific words are not found in the actual text, then the concept is not constitutionally sound. We heard this before, and given the opportunity Associate Justice Antonin "Nino" Scalia will affirm this error. Scalia is of the school that since the actual word "privacy" is not found in the Constitution there is no right to privacy.

O'Donnell is correct those words are not found in the Constitution. What is found in the Constitution is the First Amendment. The First Amendment provides two important clauses regarding religion. First is the Establishment Clause, which prohibits the federal government from establishing religion. Second is the Free Exercise Clause, which prohibits the government from interfering with a person's free exercise of their religion.

It is generally understood and accepted that the First Amendment's Establishment Clause provides the underpinnings of the doctrine of Separation of Church and State. It is hardly conceivable that the Founding Fathers could have anticipated the actual language which would come to frame the Establishment Clause.

Where then did "Separation of Church and State" come into being? We can thank the good folk of the Danbury, Connecticut Baptist Association for their letter to the newly inaugurated President Thomas Jefferson. These Baptists were concerned about whether they were able to practice their religious beliefs as inalienable rights or as favors granted by the state.

President Jefferson replied, in pertinent part:

"Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church & State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties." (Emphasis Added).

Jefferson succinctly summarized the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause as a wall of separation. If Christine O'Donnell cannot wrap her mind around this important construct of American liberty then she does not have the smarts to provide the independent judgment necessary to be a United States Senator.

Most of the case law dealing with the Establishment Clause is recent. There appears only one older case. In Bradfield v. Roberts, (1899), the federal government funded a hospital for the District of Columbia. The contract for the hospital was granted to a Roman Catholic religious order of the "Sisters of Charity". The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Associate Justice Rufus Peckham, said that there was a secular purpose in establishing the hospital.

The fact that the hospital was being run by nuns was only an incidental factor, the purpose of the hospital was to provide health care, rather than establish Roman Catholicism as our religion. That institution, Providence Hospital, continues in operation today as part of Ascension Health, the nation's largest Catholic and nonprofit health system.

In 1947 the Supreme Court opened the modern line of Establishment Clause cases with Everson v. Board of Education. In that case a New Jersey statute authorized parents of parochial school students to be reimbursed for the expenses of school bus fees. Associate Justice Hugo Black said Jefferson got it correct and that the Establishment Clause was intended to erect a wall of separation between church and state. Neither the state or federal government, said Black, could establish a religion. The New Jersey law was upheld because the law applied to all citizens equally, the secular purpose of the law was to provide the safe transportation of children, and the payments went to the parents of the children instead of to the Church.

A case which did not reach the United States Supreme Court was heard by New Mexico's courts and is known as the Dixon School Case, see Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951). Here the local public schools were abolished by the local school board which in turn recognized the Roman Catholic parochial school system as the public schools. Protestant parents protested to no avail and brought suit. The trial judge ruled the state had violated the separation of church and state doctrine. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed, and neither party sought further relief from the federal courts.

The Scalia school of constitutional interpretation wants bright lines and abhors the shadows where the jurist must rely on reasoned analysis to provide consistence, coherence, and clarity to the brick and mortar upon which stare decisis is built by case law. These folks want a test to say all ilk and manner of religion sponsored in any way shape or form by government is wrong, or the doctrine of separation of church and state is a fraud.

There is a test. It was developed by a unanimous Supreme Court in the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman. The Lemon Test has three prongs. 1) There must be a secular legislative purpose supporting the government's actions. 2) The primary effect of the governmental action must to neither advance or inhibit religious activity. 3) No excessive governmental entanglements with religion can result.

Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote the opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman. In 1968 Pennsylvania passed a law reimbursing religious (typically Roman Catholic) schools for the salaries of teachers who taught secular subject matter, books and supplies for non-religious schools. The net result was that parochial schools were being subsidized by the state in contravention of the Establishment Clause. Without the reimbursements the parochial schools would not be able to provide for these teachers, books, and materials. Associate Justice William Douglas offers a good brief history of recent Establishment Clause cases in his concurrence.

Scalia doesn't like the Lemon Test. He said so in the case of Lambs Chapel and John Stiegerwald v. Center Moriches Union School District. Note: the case was decided on the basis of the First Amendment's Free Speech clause using the same test employed for Separation of State cases. A New York statute permitted local school districts to make their facilities available to community groups after-hours. Moriches Union allowed community groups discussing family issues to use their facilities after-hours. Enter a church armed with the video lectures of noted Christian Psychologist Dr. James Dobson. I am not a huge fan of Dr. Dobson but I am a huge fan of the concept that more speech is better than less speech. Since the facility was available to persons discussing family values from a non-Christian perspective it is impermissible to deny Christians the opportunity to use the facility because of their theological perspective.

The majority opinion was written by Associate Justice Bryon White. Associate Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he said:

"As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in a late night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District."

"I cannot join for yet another reason: the Court's statement that the proposed use of the school's facilities is constitutional because (among other things) it would not signal endorsement of religion in general. What a strange notion, that a Constitution which itself gives "religion in general" preferential treatment (I refer to the Free Exercise Clause) forbids endorsement of religion in general. The Attorney General of New York not only agrees with that strange notion, he has an explanation for it: "Religious advocacy," he writes, "serves the community only in the eyes of its adherents and yields a benefit only to those who already believe." That was not the view of those who adopted our Constitution, who believed that the public virtues inculcated by religion are a public good. It suffices to point out that during the summer of 1789, when it was in the process of drafting the First Amendment, Congress enacted the famous Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1789, Article III of which provides, "Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." 1 Stat. 52 . Unsurprisingly, then, indifference to "religion in general" is not what our cases, both old and recent, demand. See, e. g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-314 (1952) ("When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemption for church property); Lynch, 465 U. S., at 673 (the Constitution "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions . . . . Anything less would require the `callous indifference' we have said was never intended" (citations omitted)); ("our precedents plainly contemplate that on occasion some advancement of religion will result from governmental action"); Marsh, supra; Presiding Bishop, supra (exemption for religious organizations from certain provisions of Civil Rights Act)."

Nino Scalia, Christine O'Donnell, and those like them are all for the Free Exercise Clause being rigorously enforced, as it should be. They want to minimize the Establishment Clause into the isolated incident where the Congress says that a particular sect, denomination, religion, or cult is the official religion of these United States. That de minimis view of the Establishment Clause does violence to the tension President Jefferson recognized between the two clauses and reminds me of a Rogers and Hammerstein lyric from the musical Oklahoma.

The song is called All Er Nothin: With me it's all er nuthin'. Is it all er nuthin' with you? It cain't be in between It cain't be now and then" With Scalia and O'Donnell no half and half decision will do.

How simple the world would be if we insisted the tough issues be pretended away.

IN SEARS v. UPTON THE SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES THE SIXTH AMENDMENT STANDARD OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Per Curiam is a Latin phrase meaning "speaking for the court." More often than not these opinions speak for a unanimous multi-judge appellate court. No one particular jurist is tasked with writing a signed opinion. Dissenting opinions, typically rare, are signed by the judge disagreeing with the per curiam decision.

Sears v. Upton is, bar none, the most interesting per curiam decision that I've ever read. That is thanks to Associate Justice Scalia's contumaciously stubborn streak!

The long title of the case is Demarcus Ali Sears v. Stephen Upton, Warden [of Georgia's Jackson State Prison]. Mr. Sears is on Death Row for "kidnapping with bodily injury. He is not on Death Row for having murdered anyone.

He was convicted in 1993 of violating Ga. Code Ann. §16–5–40(d)(4) (2006). Sears and an accomplice kidnapped a woman in Georgia. She was killed in Kentucky. The fact of the lady's demise in Kentucky is a statutory aggravating circumstance, under Georgia law, warranting the imposition of a capital sentence. This follows a theory of felony murder.

Felony murder does not require the criminal defendant commit the fatal act, he need only be a perpetrator in a crime where a person died as a direct and proximate result of the underlying crime. He doesn't need to pull the trigger. For instance consider a store being robbed and a police officer becomes involved in a shootout with the criminals. The store clerk is killed by the officer's bullet. The robbers are guilty of Felony Murder. This is Black Letter Law and Demarcus Ali Sears is wrong thinking that the law is unfair.

That last sentence really goes to the heart of the case. The problem with the sentencing is the problem with Sears' cognitive function. More on that later.

Sears launched a categorical Eighth Amendment challenge to his conviction under the kidnapping theory, which the Court declined to address. The Court footnoted that any jurisdictional challenge for Georgia imposing the Death Sentence which occurred in Kentucky was not before them.

The Eighth Amendment

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

During the penalty phase of Sears' capital trial, the mitigation phase, the defense presented evidence that this crime was out of character for Sears who had been reared in a loving middle-class home. Several witnesses testified that an imposition of the Death Sentence would adversely affect them.

Anyone who watches crime drama knows that this wasn't a good idea. A 59 year old woman, wife, mother, grandmother, named Gloria Ann Wilbur, was raped and murdered. The convicted defendant's evidence is that his family and friends will be burdened by his execution. That dog don't hunt.

The State turned that argument on the defendant, boy howdy! Here's what they did:

With Sears, the prosecutor told the jury, “[w]e don’t have a deprived child from an inner city; a person who[m] society has turned its back on at an early age. But, yet, we have a person, privileged in every way, who has rejected every opportunity that was afforded him.”

I'd say "Oh Boy How Do You Do!" as an expression of amazement and surprise, but the Southern translation of that is "Boy Howdy!" Sears is portrayed as a typical Ohio youth seized with all the advantages that modern society can offer. But is that true? Yes he came from Ohio. Did Sears' attorney at trial portray a correct depiction of Sears? Did the attorney do a good job? That question is at the crux of the Court's analysis.

Mitigation means to lessen the severe impact of the offense, to partly excuse the crime. It does not mean anything like absolution, which would wash the crime away. Mitigation, that's a noun. Mitigate is a transitive verb. Did Sears' attorney at trial investigate his client? If you don't investigate your client how can you determine the best strategy to pursue in the mitigation, or conversely the worst?

The Trial Court which oversaw Sears' postconviction relief ruled that Sears had made a mitigation defense. That court demonstrated that Sears' mitigation defense was Constitutionally inadequate.

"After finding constitutionally deficient attorney performance under the framework we set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), the state post conviction court found itself unable to assess whether counsel’s inadequate investigation might have prejudiced Sears... Because Sears’ counsel did present some mitigation evidence during Sears’ penalty phase—but not the significant mitigation evidence a Constitutionally adequate investigation would have uncovered—the state court determined it could not speculate as to what the effect of additional evidence would have been."

So what did the Court say in Strickland v. Washington? Well, that was a case from 1984 where the Supreme Court reversed a Death Penalty case from Florida on Sixth Amendment Grounds.

The Sixth Amendment

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

The abbreviated facts of Strickland have the defendant going on a 10 day crime spree during which time he stabbed 3 persons to death while committing various other crimes. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Strickland had received the effective Assistance of Counsel required by the Sixth Amendment.

Associate Justice O'Connor delivered the 8 - 1 opinion of the Court, Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall was the lone dissenter. Strickland provides us with a two part test for determining if trial counsel was effective or not.

A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or setting aside of a death sentence requires that the defendant show, first that counsel's performance was deficient and, second that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

Those are the two parts of Strickland test, the lawyer underperformed and the deficient lawyering deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Remember that fairness is the essence of Due Process of Law.

Back to Sears. After sentencing the case goes into postconviction relief mode where the judgments and sentencing of the trial court are appealed. During Sears' postconviction proceedings it turns out that the rosy depiction of Sears' upbringing was not based in fact.

His parents provided a combative home filled with their physically abusive relationship. They divorced while Sears was young. Sears had been sexually abused by an adolescent male cousin. His mother's pet name for her children was "Mother's little fuckers." Sears' father was verbally abusive. An art teacher recalled with shock Sears' father severely berating the child at a parent teacher conference. The father also disciplined Sears with age inappropriate military style drills. Sears struggled in school, demonstrating substantial behavior problems from a very young age. By the time Sears reached high school, he was described as severely learning disabled and as severely behaviorally handicapped.

It gets worse. Sears suffered significant frontal lobe abnormalities. Two different psychological experts testified that Sears had substantial deficits in mental cognition and reasoning—i.e., “problems with planning, sequencing and impulse control,” —as a result of several serious head injuries he suffered as a child, as well as drug and alcohol abuse.

Regardless of the cause of his brain damage, his scores on at least two standardized assessment tests placed him at or below the first percentile in several categories of cognitive function, making him among the most impaired individuals in the population in terms of ability to suppress competing impulses and conform behavior only to relevant stimuli.

The assessment also revealed that Sears’ ability to organize his choices, assign them relative weight and select among them in a deliberate way is grossly impaired. Sears lacks the capacity to make good choice, forget about wise choices.

From an etiological standpoint, one expert explained that Sears’ history is replete with multiple head trauma, substance abuse and traumatic experiences of the type expected to lead to these significant impairments.

Sears performed dismally on several of the forensic tests administered to him to assess his frontal lobe functioning. On the Stroop Word Interference Test, which measures response inhibition, id., at 36–37, 99.6% of those individuals in his cohort (which accounts for age, education, and background) performed better than he did.

On the Trail-Making B test, which also measures frontal lobe functioning, Sears performed at the first (and lowest) percentile. Based on these results, the expert’s first-hand observations, and an extensive review of Sears’ personal history, the expert’s opinion was unequivocal: There is clear and compelling evidence” that Sears has “pronounced frontal lobe pathology.

Sears' older brother was a criminal, a convicted drug dealer and user, who introduced Sears to a life of crime. These facts actually are consistent with a mitigation theory portraying Sears as an individual with diminished judgment and reasoning skills, who may have desired to follow in the footsteps of an older brother who had shut him out of his life.

The fact that some of the evidence may have been “hearsay” does not necessarily undermine its value—or its admissibility—for penalty phase purposes. The Court footnoted that "we have also recognized that reliable hearsay evidence that is relevant to a capital defendant’s mitigation defense should not be excluded by rote application of a state hearsay rule."

Competent counsel should have been able to turn some of the adverse evidence into a positive—perhaps in support of a cognitive deficiency mitigation theory. In particular, evidence of Sears’ grandiose self-conception and evidence of his magical thinking, were features, in another well credentialed expert’s view of a “profound personality disorder." This evidence might not have made Sears any more likable to the jury, but it might well have helped the jury understand Sears, and his horrendous acts—especially in light of his purportedly stable upbringing.

Because counsel failed to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation, none of this evidence was known to Sears’ trial counsel. It emerged only during state postconviction relief.

The Trial Court noted that Sears' trial counsel was Constitutionally deficient as to the penalty phase investigation. In the Trial Court's view, the cursory nature of counsel’s investigation into mitigation evidence—“limited to one day or less, talking to witnesses selected by [Sears’] mother”—was “on its face . . . Constitutionally inadequate.”

The lawyer underperformed. Clearly the first prong of the Strickland test has been met. The Supreme Court was surprised at the Trial Court's analysis under the second prong of the Strickland test. Did the deficient lawyering prejudice the defense so much that the proceeding were not fair?

The per curiam opinion says "Although the court appears to have stated the proper prejudice standard, it did not correctly conceptualize how that standard applies to the circumstances of this case. The Trial Court asked whether “there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of his trial would have been different if [Sears'] counsel had done more investigation.”

The Trial Court reasoned that since some mitigation evidence was produced during the penalty phase that other cases where little or no mitigation evidence was produced were not on point. The Trial Court said it could not make a reasonable prediction as to whether Sears' defense was so prejudiced by Constitutionally deficient lawyering to render the mitigation phase Constitutionally infirm.

The Supreme Court finds two problems with the Trial Court's analysis. First the Trial Court placed undue reliance on the assumed reasonableness of counsel's mitigation theory, and curtailed its prejudice inquiry. Rather, the Supreme Court says "The court’s determination that counsel had conducted a constitutionally deficient mitigation investigation, should have, at the very least, called into question the reasonableness of this theory." The prejudice inquiry should be pursued.

The second problem was that when the Trial Court found a Constitutionally deficient mitigation then it should have, at minimum, called into question of the reasonableness of counsel's theory. Relying on Wiggins v. Smith, the Court said “counsel’s failure to uncover and present voluminous mitigating evidence at sentencing could not be justified as a tactical decision . . . because counsel had not ‘fulfill[ed] their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background."

One of the reasons I called this the most interesting per curiam decision that I've ever read is because it is rare for disagreements on the Court to break out into open skirmishes. Footnote nine takes a direct shot at Associate Justice Scalia.

9 Channeling powers of telepathy, JUSTICE SCALIA asserts that what the trial court actually decided in this case is that “Sears’ trial counsel presented a reasonable mitigation theory and offered evidence sufficient to support it, so the prejudice inquiry was more difficult—so difficult that Sears could not make the requisite showing.” Post, at 4. Such a highly favorable reading of the trial court’s analysis would be far more convincing had the trial court engaged with the evidence as JUSTICE SCALIA does. But it offered no such analysis in its opinion; indeed, it appears the court did not even conduct any real analysis, explaining that it was “impossible to know what effect” the evidence might have had on the jury.

The Court notices that Associate Justice Scalia chides them in his dissent. Associate Justice Scalia's rancor stems from the per curiam opinion's conclusion that the Trial Court made assumptions rather than judicial findings. The majority rebuffs that saying:

"But our point is that any finding with respect to the reasonableness of the mitigation theory counsel utilized—in this case, family impact—is in tension with the trial court’s unambiguous finding that counsel’s investigation was itself so unreasonable as to be facially unconstitutional. This point is plain in Williams: We rejected any suggestion that a decision to focus on one potentially reasonable trial strategy—in that case, petitioner’s voluntary confession—was “justified by a tactical decision” when “counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.” 529 U. S., at 396. A “tactical decision” is a precursor to concluding that counsel has developed a “reasonable” mitigation theory in a particular case. [emphasis added]"

Recall that when scrutinizing statutes the Court tells us that facial challenges are the most difficult to proove.  The standard for being facially infirm is the inconceivable standard.  It is inconceivable that under any circumstance the statute does not violate the Constitution.  Here the Court is telling us that it is inconceivable under any circumstance that counsel's investigation leads to a Constitutionally sound tactical theory.

The Supreme Court rejects the argument that the reasonableness of the theory is relevant when evaluating the impact of evidence that would have been available and which would likely have been introduced but for counsel's Constitutionally inadequate investigation. The standard is clear, if you are going to try a Capital Case you must look at every conceivable circumstance of the defendant's background. Do not get in a hurry with your theory and place all of your eggs in one basket.

Once the State has proven each and every element of the Capital offense beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury and a guilty verdict has been rendered defense counsel's duty is to fully engage in the mitigation phase of the trial. That cannot be done where counsel is ignorant of the facts of the defendant's life and health.

Then there is Associate Justice Scalia, joined by Associate Justice Thomas. The dissent found no error of law in the proceedings below. Remanding this case, as the Court has done, is purposeless, according to Associate Justice Scalia. He says the Trial Court has already found that "no reasonable likelihood that the mitigation evidence...would have persuaded a jury to change its mind about the death sentence for this brutal rape-murder."

Associate Justice Scalia's thinking is troubling. The jury is not to have made up its mind as to the death sentence or any other punishment until after evidence is presented to them during the mitigation phase of the trial. They are sent to deliberate on that evidence. Their mind is to be made up during that deliberation. Associate Justice Scalia presumes the jurors have violated their oaths to keep their minds open on this issue until the sentencing part of the case is presented to them.

Associate Justice Scalia attacks the Court's implementation of the two pronged test from Strickland. Both the dissent and the per curiam opinion agree that the first part of the Strickland test was properly applied. The dispute is about the second part, whether the defense was prejudiced to the point of rendering the case unfair.

Scalia challenges the Court's finding that the Trial Court made two errors determining prejudice. As noted above, Scalia says the Trial Court made judicial findings and did not engage in making assumptions. Scalia gives deference to the Trial Court.

Then Scalia feathers his argument claiming the Court's second error is encased within the first. The Court claims, says Scalia, that the Trial Court limited its prejudice inquiry under Strickland where there was little or no mitigation evidence presented. The Supreme Court holds that the Trial Court erred by determining that presentation of some mitigation evidence foreclosed further prejudice inquiry. Scalia says that is not a fair reading of the case. "The state court did not hold that a defendant could never suffer prejudice whenever his counsel provided any mitigation evidence."

That appears to me as a distinction without a difference. During the postconviction phase of the case the defense is making its last arguments. Habeas Corpus relief does not provide for more than one bite at the apple. When the Appellate Court held that Sears' was not prejudiced by his attorney's ineffective assistance, they held that Sears, absent relief from the Federal Judiciary, could never suffer prejudice in this case.

A word about jurisdiction, the Court addressed the subject in footnote one. "Although this is a state-court decision, it resolved a federal issue on exclusively federal-law grounds. We therefore have jurisdiction. 28 U. S. C. §1257; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. ___ (2010) (reviewing state postconviction decision raising Sixth Amendment question)."

The Abortion Cases Part Eleven

Abortion remains a volatile issue on the Court

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey the Supreme Court eked out another close decision fractured even as to who authors what part of the opinion. It was a 5-4 decision. Associate Justice O'Connor, Associate Justices Kennedy and Justice Souter announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI, an opinion with respect to Part V E, in which Justice Stevens joins, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV, V-B, and V-D.

Associate Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part from the majority opinion.

Associate Justice Blackmun concurred in part, concurred in the judgment in part, and dissented in part. Blackmun joined parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI of the majority opinion.

Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. He was joined by Associate Justices Scalia and Thomas.

Associate Justice Scalia wrote an opinion dissenting in part, he was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justices White and Thomas.

Five sections of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 were at issue in this case.

1. §3205 requiring a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed;
2. § 3206 mandating the informed consent of one parent for a minor to obtain an abortion, but providing a judicial bypass procedure;
3. §3209 commanding that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband;
4. §3203 defining "medical emergency" by which compliance with the foregoing requirements are excused;
5. §§ 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(f), imposing certain reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services.

This case mounts another facial challenge to the constitutionality of a State law on abortions. Here the petitioners, five abortion clinics, a pro se physician, and a class of doctors who provide abortion services brought suit for declaratory relief asking that the several sections listed above were unconstitutional; they also sought injunctive relief.

The District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, striking down the husband notification provision but upholding the balance.

The opinion said "After considering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles of institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed"

O'Connor wrote: "Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code. The underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these philosophic questions in such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter, except perhaps in those rare circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger to her own life or health, or is the result of rape or incest."

Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor addresses the self-evident tension in Roe between a woman's unfettered right under the Fourteenth Amendment to terminate her pregnancy and the State's interests in protecting potential life. She said:

"That brings us, of course, to the point where much criticism has been directed at Roe, a criticism that always inheres when the Court draws a specific rule from what in the Constitution is but a general standard. We conclude, however, that the urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control over her destiny and her body, claims implicit in the meaning of liberty, require us to perform that function. Liberty must not be extinguished for want of a line that is clear. And it falls to us to give some real substance to the woman's liberty to determine whether to carry her pregnancy to full term.

We conclude the line should be drawn at viability, so that before that time the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. We adhere to this principle for two reasons. First, as we have said, is the doctrine of stare decisis. Any judicial act of line drawing may seem somewhat arbitrary, but Roe was a reasoned statement, elaborated with great care. We have twice reaffirmed it in the face of great opposition. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 759; Akron I, 462 U. S., at 419-420. Although we must overrule those parts of Thornburgh and Akron I which, in our view, are inconsistent with Roe's statement that the State has a legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of the unborn, see infra, at ___, the central premise of those cases represents an unbroken commitment by this Court to the essential holding of Roe. It is that premise which we reaffirm today.

The second reason is that the concept of viability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 163. Consistent with other constitutional norms, legislatures may draw lines which appear arbitrary without the necessity of offering a justification. But courts may not. We must justify the lines we draw. And there is no line other than viability which is more workable. To be sure, as we have said, there may be some medical developments that affect the precise point of viability, but this is an imprecision within tolerable limits given that the medical community and all those who must apply its discoveries will continue to explore the matter. The viability line also has, as a practical matter, an element of fairness. In some broad sense it might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State's intervention on behalf of the developing child.

The woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce."

The majority rejected the trimester rule established by the Court in Roe. "The trimester framework no doubt was erected to ensure that the woman's right to choose not become so subordinate to the State's interest in promoting fetal life that her choice exists in theory but not in fact. We do not agree, however, that the trimester approach is necessary to accomplish this objective. A framework of this rigidity was unnecessary and in its later interpretation sometimes contradicted the State's permissible exercise of its powers."

The Court's majority deftly addresses the interests of the States in these cases. "The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue. In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty."

Feathering out the dimensions of the undue burden standard O'Connor wrote that "[a] finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.

"Some guiding principles should emerge," the majority said. "What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to choose. Unless it has that effect on her right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal. Regulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden."

Abortion is not an unfettered right

Addressing the particular clauses of the Pennsylvania statute listed above O'Connor begins with point four, §3203 defining "medical emergency."

That section says a medical emergency is "[t]hat condition which, on the basis of the physician's good faith clinical judgment, so complicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function."

The opinion said that §3203 imposed no undue burden on a woman's abortion right.

The Court next addressed §3205 requiring a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed.

Informed consent continued to be a focus of a State's limits in expressing its preference for live childbirth. O'Connor wrote "To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the 'probable gestational age' of the fetus, those cases go too far, are inconsistent with Roe's acknowledgment of an important interest in potential life, and are overruled."

Upholding §3205 the Court said "Even the broadest reading of Roe, however, has not suggested that there is a constitutional right to abortion on demand. See, e. g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 189. Rather, the right protected by Roe is a right to decide to terminate a pregnancy free of undue interference by the State. Because the informed consent requirement facilitates the wise exercise of that right it cannot be classified as an interference with the right Roe protects. The informed consent requirement is not an undue burden on that right."

Evidence at trial demonstrated a litany of harms that present themselves to a woman where she is required by law to get the husband's consent as §3209 mandates. In striking down this provision the Court said "The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion. It does not merely make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain; for many women, it will impose a substantial obstacle. We must not blind ourselves to the fact that the significant number of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases"

O'Connor traced the legal history of marriage back to a time when women had no rights and were seen only as extensions of their husbands. She wrote "Section 3209 embodies a view of marriage consonant with the common law status of married women but repugnant to our present understanding of marriage and of the nature of the rights secured by the Constitution. Women do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they marry. The Constitution protects all individuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of governmental power, even where that power is employed for the supposed benefit of a member of the individual's family. These considerations confirm our conclusion that §3209 is invalid"

The Court rejected, again, the notion that parental consent violates a minor's rights under Roe where a judicial bypass is provided by the statute. The Court said "We have been over most of this ground before. Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure"

The Court affirmed part and invalidated part of the record keeping requirements of the Pennsylvania law. "Subsection (12) of the reporting provision requires the reporting of, among other things, a married woman's "reason for failure to provide notice" to her husband. § 3214(a)(12). This provision in effect requires women, as a condition of obtaining an abortion, to provide the Commonwealth with the precise information we have already recognized that many women have pressing reasons not to reveal. Like the spousal notice requirement itself, this provision places an undue burden on a woman's choice, and must be invalidated for that reason."

Associate Justice Stevens wrote an opinion which concurred in part and dissented in part. He was concerned that more clarification was needed to guide the States as to when their interest in maternal health and live childbirth could override the privacy interest of the woman to make the choice to terminate her pregnancy.  The counterpoise from the States' interest in potential life was the liberty interest of the mother.

Pennsylvania's Governor Robert P. Casey, Sr. depicted as a Pope

He was also concerned that State law reflected secular, avoiding any violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. "First, it is clear that, in order to be legitimate, the State's interest must be secular; consistent with the First Amendment the State may not promote a theological or sectarian interest."
Stevens rejects the Court's decisions in Akron and Thornburg He wrote "Those sections require a physician or counselor to provide the woman with a range of materials clearly designed to persuade her to choose not to undergo the abortion. While the State is free, pursuant to § 3208 of the Pennsylvania law, to produce and disseminate such material, the State may not inject such information into the woman's deliberations just as she is weighing such an important choice."

Associate Justice Blackmun, appreciative of the affirmation of the Court's decision in Roe, nevertheless expressed concern about the hostile judicial activism mounting on the Court to the landmark case. He wrote "I do not underestimate the significance of today's joint opinion. Yet I remain steadfast in my belief that the right to reproductive choice is entitled to the full protection afforded by this Court before Webster. And I fear for the darkness as four Justices anxiously await the single vote necessary to extinguish the light.

He continued " Make no mistake, the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter is an act of personal courage and constitutional principle. In contrast to previous decisions in which Justices O'Connor and Kennedy postponed reconsideration of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the authors of the joint opinion today join Justice Stevens and me in concluding that "the essential holding of Roe should be retained and once again reaffirmed." In brief, five Members of this Court today recognize that "the Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages."

Chief Justice Rehnquist, ironically anchored his rebuff of the Substantive Due Process Rights of a woman's liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the case of Bowers v. Hardwick. The Bowers case dealt with Georgia criminalizing sodomy; oral and anal sex between consenting adults. I say ironic because the Supreme Court managed to overrule Bowers seventeen years later in a similar case from Texas, Lawrence v. Texas. Rehnquist generally assails the majority in his somewhat rambling dissent.

Associate Justice Nino Scalia, in his dissent, said that he does not believe that our "Liberty" is not protected by the Constitution. "The issue is whether it is a liberty protected by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not. I reach that conclusion not because of anything so exalted as my views concerning the "concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Rather, I reach it for the same reason I reach the conclusion that bigamy is not constitutionally protected--because of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed."

Associate Justice Antonin Scalia

Apparently Nino Scalia has never read the Constitution which begins with the Preamble. "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."