Has Kris Kobach Once Again Run Amok On The Shoals Of Preemption? - Part One - Maria Gonzalez v. Arizona

While preparing a blog posting on Kansas' new prove your citizenship please, as you register to vote, otherwise known as HB 2067 the case of Maria Gonzalez v. Arizona reared its lovely head.

This case is interesting because after the three judge panel (which included retired United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor) the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued this order. "Upon the vote of a majority of nonrecused active judges, it is ordered that- this case be reheard en banc pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3. The three-judge panel opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit." This is what is known as an en banc order, meaning that the case will be reheard by all active judges of the Ninth Circuit who have not recused themselves.

In terms of appellate advocacy, an en banc opinion carries more weight than the opinion of a three judge panel. Such opinions are less likely to be overturned on appeal by the United States Supreme Court because the possibility of all the judges of the circuit making the same error of law is remote.

My inquiry took me to the national motor voter law better known as the National Voter Registration Act, [NVRA], 42 U.S.C. §1977gg - 3. What then did that three judge panel say about proof of citizenship? The opinion, which is not precedential, was heard by O'Connor, Circuit Judge Sandra Ikuta, and Chief Judge Alex Kozinski. Ikuta wrote the majority opinion and Kozinski wrote a dissent.

The three judge panel also took a hard look at the NVRA and reached opposing conclusions. For his part Chief Judge Kozinski adheres to precedent. The Ninth Circuit has previously held that the NVRA did not preempt States from requiring proof of citizenship. See, Gonzalez I, 485 F.3d at 1048.

Judge Kozinski's dissent focuses on the rules of precedent and how the Ninth Circuit has been resolving differences between three judge panel opinions which differ from en banc opinions. Like making sausage, this is not pretty.

Ikuta's majority opinion provides the history. "The Gonzalez I panel thereafter affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction, holding that Proposition 200’s registration requirement was not a poll tax, id. at 1049, and was not a violation of the NVRA, id. at 1050-51. The district court subsequently granted Arizona’s motion for summary judgment, relying on Gonzalez I to rule that Proposition 200 was not an unconstitutional poll tax and was not invalid as conflicting with the NVRA. After trial, the district court resolved all other claims in favor of Arizona, holding that Proposition 200 did not violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and did not discriminate against naturalized citizens or burden the fundamental right to vote in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause." Emphasis added.

The Elections Clause

Ikuta's analysis first looks at the Elections Clause of the Constitution. "In a nutshell, the Elections Clause gives state governments initial responsibility to regulate the mechanics of national elections, “but only so far as Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices.” Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997)."

The history of the Elections Clause reveals the reasoning behind this unusual delegation of power. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states had full authority to maintain, appoint, or recall congressional delegates. At the Philadelphia Convention, delegates expressed concern that, if left unfettered, states could use this power to frustrate the creation of the national government, most obviously by neglecting to hold federal elections. The Framers decided that Congress should be given the authority to oversee the states’ procedures related to national elections as a safeguard against potential state abuse.

Ikuta writes that a "state’s role in the creation and implementation of federal election procedures under the Elections Clause is to administer the elections through its own procedures until Congress deems otherwise; if and when Congress acts, the states are obligated to conform to and carry out whatever procedures Congress requires."

The Supremacy Clause

Ikuta notes that the Supreme Court has given the federal courts guidance when interpreting the Supremacy Clause. First, in examining claims that a federal law preempts a state statute through the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court instructs courts to begin with a presumption against preemption. Second, the Court has adopted a “plain statement rule,” holding that a federal statute preempts a state statute only when it is the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress” to do so.

Ikuta finds that " the Elections Clause, as a standalone preemption provision, establishes its own balance, resolving all conflicts in favor of the federal government." The inquiry into the presumption against preemption does not apply in Election Clauses cases. This is true because the power over elections is delegated to the States and is not a power reserved to them.

Ikuta's approach is to " consider the state and federal laws as if they comprise a single system of federal election procedures." She explains that "[if] the state law complements the congressional procedural scheme, we treat it as if it were adopted by Congress as part of that scheme. ... If Congress addressed the same subject as the state law, we consider whether the federal act has superseded the state act, based on a natural reading of the two laws and viewing the federal act as if it were a subsequent enactment by the same legislature."

Ikuta then takes her analysis into an attempt to harmonize the NVRA with Arizona's Proposition 200. She looks first at Congressional intent. : Congress enacted the NVRA because, among other reasons, it determined that discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures can have a direct and damaging effect on voter participation in elections for Federal office and disproportionately harm voter participation by various groups, including racial minorities.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(a)."

Going through the history of Congress' efforts to eliminate discriminatory and unfair voter registration laws Ikuta explains the painfully slow process of litigation before moving on the Voting Rights Act, [VRA]. The VRA accomplished many of the Congressional goals concerning voting, but did not address the problems of voter registration. Citing legislative history she says "the VRA failed to address voter registration procedures, which imposed a “complicated maze of local laws and procedures, in some cases as restrictive as the outlawed practices, through which eligible citizens had to navigate in order to exercise their right to vote,” H.R. Rep. No. 103-9, at 3 (1993)."

Congressional Intent

"Congress found that, while over eighty percent of registered citizens voted in Presidential elections, only sixty percent of eligible voters were registered. H.R. Rep. No. 103-9, at 3. Public opinion polls showed that the primary reason eligible citizens were not voting was the failure to register. Id. While acknowledging that this failure was attributable to many factors outside its control, Congress enacted the NVRA to address the problems within its control, namely those barriers to registration that were imposed by state governments. See id. Under the Elections Clause, Congress had the power “to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to . . . registration.” Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). Through this authority, Congress enacted the NVRA to remove these obstacles and “to provide simplified systems for registering to vote in federal elections.” Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, 275 (1997),"

Ikuta then connects the Congressional intent with the scheme of practice which the NVRA imposes on the states. That scheme includes not only permitting voter registration at the Departments of Motor Vehicles, but also requiring State Offices which serve the poor and disabled, those who would not necessarily come into contact with the drivers license bureau, to provide voter registration services.

Ikuta goes into detail about the proscribe Federal Form for Voter Registration. Here is the pertinent part of the statute.

The Federal Form:

(1) may require only such identifying information (including the

signature of the applicant) and other information (including data

relating to previous registration by the applicant), as is necessary

to enable the appropriate State election official to assess the eligibility

of the applicant and to administer voter registration and

other parts of the election process;

(2) shall include a statement that—

(A) specifies each eligibility requirement (including citizenship);

(B) contains an attestation that the applicant meets each such

requirement; and

(C) requires the signature of the applicant, under penalty of perjury;

(3) may not include any requirement for notarization or other formal

authentication; and

(4) shall include, in print that is identical to that used in the attestation

portion of the application—

(I) [voter eligibility requirements and penalties for false applications,

§ 1973gg-6(a)(5)]

(ii) a statement that, if an applicant declines to register to vote,

the fact that the applicant has declined to register will remain

confidential and will be used only for voter registration purposes;

and

(iii) a statement that if an applicant does not register to vote, the

office at which the applicant submits a voter registration application

will remain confidential and will be used only for voter registration

purposes.

§ 1973gg-7(b).

Election Clause Analysis: Is Proposition 200’s documentary proof of citizenship requirement is superseded by the NVRA ?

The appellate court considered if the state and federal enactments together as if they composed a single system of federal election procedures. Then the appellate court considered whether consider whether, read naturally, the NVRA provisions complement Proposition 200’s voter registration requirements or supersede them. The holding said that where "a natural interpretation of the language of the two enactments leads to the conclusion that the state law does not function consistently and harmoniously with the overriding federal scheme, then it is replaced by the federal statute."

Ikuta Finds Conflict

"Applying this framework, we conclude that Proposition 200’s documentary proof of citizenship requirement conflicts with the NVRA’s text, structure, and purpose. First, the NVRA addresses precisely the same topic as Proposition 200 in greater specificity, namely, the information that will be required to ensure that an applicant is eligible to vote in federal elections."

"Given the NVRA’s comprehensive regulation of the development of the Federal Form, there is no room for Arizona to impose sua sponte an additional identification requirement as a prerequisite to federal voter registration for registrants using that form. If viewed as a second enactment by the same legislature, the NVRA clearly subsumes Proposition 200’s additional documentary requirement on registrants using the Federal Form."

Congressional Intent Vitiated

"Further supporting this conclusion," Ikuta writes, "the value of the Federal Form (and hence a centerpiece of the NVRA) would be lost, and Congress’s goal to eliminate states’ discriminatory or onerous registration requirements vitiated, if we were to agree with Arizona that states could add any requirements they saw fit to registration for federal elections through the Federal Form."

"Moreover, specific statutory language in the NVRA, when read in an unstrained and natural manner, is inconsistent with the state enactment. The NVRA mandates that states “shall accept and use” the Federal Form when applicants register by mail. § 1973gg-4(a). It likewise requires “acceptance” of the completed Federal Form at state office buildings, which must be transmitted to the appropriate State election officials. § 1973gg-5(a)(4)(iii). The state must implement these methods of registering voters, as well as the combined motor vehicle-voter registration form, § 1973gg-3(c)(1), “notwithstanding any other Federal or state law,” § 1973gg-2(a)."

"Structurally, allowing states to impose their own requirements for federal voter registration on registrants using the Federal Form would nullify the NVRA’s procedure for soliciting state input, and aggrandize the states’ role in direct contravention of the lines of authority prescribed by Section 7. The NVRA permits states to suggest changes to the Federal Form, but gives the EAC ultimate authority to adopt or reject those suggestions. § 1973gg-7(a)."

"Proposition 200 is not in harmony with the intent behind the NVRA, which is to reduce state-imposed obstacles to federal registration. It is indisputable that by requiring documentary proof of citizenship, Proposition 200 creates an additional state hurdle to registration. As indicated in our overview, supra Part C.2, the NVRA was sensitive to the multiple purposes of a federal voter registration scheme, including the need “to establish procedures that [would] increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office” and the need to protect “the integrity of the electoral process.” § 1973gg(b). The balance struck by the EAC pursuant to § 1973gg-7(a) was to require applicants to attest to their citizenship under penalty of perjury, but not to require the presentation of documentary proof."

Stay tuned to the opinion of the Ninth Circuit en banc. Once the judges get past the sausage making I expect they will hammer out an opinion, with a dissent or two. This is the stuff that makes its way to the Supreme Court because the Court takes its role in clarifying the law seriously.

 

The Abortion Cases Part Twelve

Nebraska's Dr. Leroy Carhart

A Nebraska law criminalizing late term abortions was the focus of the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart. The Court's majority consisted of five Associate Justices Stephen Breyer, who wrote the opinion and was joined by Associate Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined. Justice O’Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Stevens joined.

There were four in dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Associate Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy.

Breyer's opening volley lays to rest any notion that the landmark decision of Roe v. Wade would be overturned. He said: 

Associate Justice Stephen Breyer

"We again consider the right to an abortion. We understand the controversial nature of the problem. Millions of Americans believe that life begins at conception and consequently that an abortion is akin to causing the death of an innocent child; they recoil at the thought of a law that would permit it. Other millions fear that a law that forbids abortion would condemn many American women to lives that lack dignity, depriving them of equal liberty and leading those with least resources to undergo illegal abortions with the attendant risks of death and suffering. Taking account of these virtually irreconcilable points of view, aware that constitutional law must govern a society whose different members sincerely hold directly opposing views, and considering the matter in light of the Constitution’s guarantees of fundamental individual liberty, this Court, in the course of a generation, has determined and then redetermined that the Constitution offers basic protection to the woman’s right to choose. Roe v. Wade; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey. We shall not revisit those legal principles. Rather, we apply them to the circumstances of this case."

The Court considered three established principles in making that application. "First, before 'viability … the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.'”

 "Second,'“a law designed to further the State’s interest in fetal life which imposes an undue burden on the woman’s decision before fetal viability' is unconstitutional. An “undue burden is … shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”

"Third, ‘subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.'"

The Nebraska statute §28—328(1) provided “No partial birth abortion shall be performed in this state, unless such procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.”

Partial Birth Abortion was defined as “an abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing the delivery.” §28—326(9).

The law further defines “partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child” to mean the “deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the person performing such procedure knows will kill the unborn child and does kill the unborn child.”

In Nebraska, a person found guilty of violating this law would be guilty of a felony "carrying a prison term of up to 20 years, and a fine of up to $25,000. §§28—328(2), 28—105. It also provides for the automatic revocation of a doctor’s license to practice medicine in Nebraska. §28—328(4)."

The Court found Nebraska's law unconstitutional, affirming the decision of the trial court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The original action was brought by Dr. Leroy Carhart seeking declaratory relief.

Nebraska law prohibited one method of abortion. For clarity the Court discussed several different abortion method. About 90% of all abortions occur in the first trimester of pregnancy, before 12 weeks of gestational age, using a method called vacuum aspiration. The procedure’s mortality rates for first trimester abortion are, for example, 5 to 10 times lower than those associated with carrying the fetus to term. Complication rates are also low."

About 10% of all abortions take place in the second trimester, gestational age weeks 12 - 24. In the 1970's second trimester abortions tended to employ the saline injection method, as discussed in Danforth v. Planned Parenthood. Since then "the medical profession has switched from medical induction of labor to surgical procedures for most second trimester abortions. The most commonly used procedure is called “dilation and evacuation” (D&E)."

D&E “refers generically to transcervical procedures performed at 13 weeks gestation or later.” American Medical Association, Report of Board of Trustees on Late-Term Abortion.

“D&E is similar to vacuum aspiration except that the cervix must be dilated more widely because surgical instruments are used to remove larger pieces of tissue. Osmotic dilators are usually used. Intravenous fluids and an analgesic or sedative may be administered. A local anesthetic such as a paracervical block may be administered, dilating agents, if used, are removed and instruments are inserted through the cervix into the uterus to removal fetal and placental tissue. Because fetal tissue is friable and easily broken, the fetus may not be removed intact. The walls of the uterus are scraped with a curette to ensure that no tissue remains.”

After 15 weeks: "Because the fetus is larger at this stage of gestation (particularly the head), and because bones are more rigid, dismemberment or other destructive procedures are more likely to be required than at earlier gestational ages to remove fetal and placental tissue.”

After 20 weeks: “Some physicians use intrafetal potassium chloride or digoxin to induce fetal demise prior to a late D&E (after 20 weeks), to facilitate evacuation.”

There are variations in D&E operative strategy; compare ibid. with W. Hern, Abortion Practice 146—156 (1984), and Medical and Surgical Abortion 133—135. However, the common points are that D&E involves (1) dilation of the cervix; (2) removal of at least some fetal tissue using nonvacuum instruments; and (3) (after the 15th week) the potential need for instrumental disarticulation or dismemberment of the fetus or the collapse of fetal parts to facilitate evacuation from the uterus.

There were two fatal flaws in the Nebraska law. First, the criminal statute did not provide any exception for the health of the mother. Second, the act imposed an undue burden on a woman's ability to choose a D&E abortion, thus unduly burdening her right to choose an abortion.

Justice Stevens said that it made no sense for Nebraska to choose one method of abortion over another. Roe v. Wade's "[h]olding–that the word “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment includes a woman’s right to make this difficult and extremely personal decision–makes it impossible for me to understand how a State has any legitimate interest in requiring a doctor to follow any procedure other than the one that he or she reasonably believes will best protect the woman in her exercise of this constitutional liberty. But one need not even approach this view today to conclude that Nebraska’s law must fall. For the notion that either of these two equally gruesome procedures performed at this late stage of gestation is more akin to infanticide than the other, or that the State furthers any legitimate interest by banning one but not the other, is simply irrational."

Justice O'Connor probably could not believe her ears when counsel for Nebraska said that the late term "procedure will not, in some circumstances, be “necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother" She said "a ban on partial-birth abortion that only proscribed the D&X method of abortion and that included an exception to preserve the life and health of the mother would be constitutional" in her view.  My bet is that a lady as mature as Justice O'Connor can recall from personal experience a number of women whose deaths were attributed to maternal mortality.  I know I can, and I am a little younger than this distinguished jurist.

Associate Justice Ruthe Bader Ginsberg

Associate Justice Ginsburg quoting the Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Richard Posner, in the case of Hope Clinic v. Ryan said "if a statute burdens constitutional rights and all that can be said on its behalf is that it is the vehicle that legislators have chosen for expressing their hostility to those rights, the burden is undue.”

Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit

Chief Justice Rehnquist deferred to the analysis of Justices Kennedy and Thomas in their dissents.

Justice Scalia, who as we recall cannot find the concept of Liberty in the Constitution, attacked the Court's opinion as "policy-judgment-couched-as-law."

Justices Kennedy and Thomas dissents violently clash with the Court's majority opinion in general and Justice O'Connor's opinion in particular. Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas would give great deference to Nebraska. They find Justice O'Connor's view that the statute would pass constitutional muster with an appropriate exception for the health of the mother disingenuous.

When the Rehnquist branch of the Court write the opinion they are seen as substituting policy for judgment couched as law. When they are in the minority they hurl that barb at the majority. Abortion remains a contentious issue on the Court.

The Court seldom airs its internal conflicts as openly as it does in these cases.

The Abortion Cases Part Eleven

Abortion remains a volatile issue on the Court

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey the Supreme Court eked out another close decision fractured even as to who authors what part of the opinion. It was a 5-4 decision. Associate Justice O'Connor, Associate Justices Kennedy and Justice Souter announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI, an opinion with respect to Part V E, in which Justice Stevens joins, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV, V-B, and V-D.

Associate Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part from the majority opinion.

Associate Justice Blackmun concurred in part, concurred in the judgment in part, and dissented in part. Blackmun joined parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI of the majority opinion.

Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. He was joined by Associate Justices Scalia and Thomas.

Associate Justice Scalia wrote an opinion dissenting in part, he was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justices White and Thomas.

Five sections of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 were at issue in this case.

1. §3205 requiring a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed;
2. § 3206 mandating the informed consent of one parent for a minor to obtain an abortion, but providing a judicial bypass procedure;
3. §3209 commanding that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband;
4. §3203 defining "medical emergency" by which compliance with the foregoing requirements are excused;
5. §§ 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(f), imposing certain reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services.

This case mounts another facial challenge to the constitutionality of a State law on abortions. Here the petitioners, five abortion clinics, a pro se physician, and a class of doctors who provide abortion services brought suit for declaratory relief asking that the several sections listed above were unconstitutional; they also sought injunctive relief.

The District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, striking down the husband notification provision but upholding the balance.

The opinion said "After considering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles of institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed"

O'Connor wrote: "Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code. The underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these philosophic questions in such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter, except perhaps in those rare circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger to her own life or health, or is the result of rape or incest."

Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor addresses the self-evident tension in Roe between a woman's unfettered right under the Fourteenth Amendment to terminate her pregnancy and the State's interests in protecting potential life. She said:

"That brings us, of course, to the point where much criticism has been directed at Roe, a criticism that always inheres when the Court draws a specific rule from what in the Constitution is but a general standard. We conclude, however, that the urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control over her destiny and her body, claims implicit in the meaning of liberty, require us to perform that function. Liberty must not be extinguished for want of a line that is clear. And it falls to us to give some real substance to the woman's liberty to determine whether to carry her pregnancy to full term.

We conclude the line should be drawn at viability, so that before that time the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. We adhere to this principle for two reasons. First, as we have said, is the doctrine of stare decisis. Any judicial act of line drawing may seem somewhat arbitrary, but Roe was a reasoned statement, elaborated with great care. We have twice reaffirmed it in the face of great opposition. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 759; Akron I, 462 U. S., at 419-420. Although we must overrule those parts of Thornburgh and Akron I which, in our view, are inconsistent with Roe's statement that the State has a legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of the unborn, see infra, at ___, the central premise of those cases represents an unbroken commitment by this Court to the essential holding of Roe. It is that premise which we reaffirm today.

The second reason is that the concept of viability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 163. Consistent with other constitutional norms, legislatures may draw lines which appear arbitrary without the necessity of offering a justification. But courts may not. We must justify the lines we draw. And there is no line other than viability which is more workable. To be sure, as we have said, there may be some medical developments that affect the precise point of viability, but this is an imprecision within tolerable limits given that the medical community and all those who must apply its discoveries will continue to explore the matter. The viability line also has, as a practical matter, an element of fairness. In some broad sense it might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State's intervention on behalf of the developing child.

The woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce."

The majority rejected the trimester rule established by the Court in Roe. "The trimester framework no doubt was erected to ensure that the woman's right to choose not become so subordinate to the State's interest in promoting fetal life that her choice exists in theory but not in fact. We do not agree, however, that the trimester approach is necessary to accomplish this objective. A framework of this rigidity was unnecessary and in its later interpretation sometimes contradicted the State's permissible exercise of its powers."

The Court's majority deftly addresses the interests of the States in these cases. "The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue. In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty."

Feathering out the dimensions of the undue burden standard O'Connor wrote that "[a] finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.

"Some guiding principles should emerge," the majority said. "What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to choose. Unless it has that effect on her right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal. Regulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden."

Abortion is not an unfettered right

Addressing the particular clauses of the Pennsylvania statute listed above O'Connor begins with point four, §3203 defining "medical emergency."

That section says a medical emergency is "[t]hat condition which, on the basis of the physician's good faith clinical judgment, so complicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function."

The opinion said that §3203 imposed no undue burden on a woman's abortion right.

The Court next addressed §3205 requiring a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed.

Informed consent continued to be a focus of a State's limits in expressing its preference for live childbirth. O'Connor wrote "To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the 'probable gestational age' of the fetus, those cases go too far, are inconsistent with Roe's acknowledgment of an important interest in potential life, and are overruled."

Upholding §3205 the Court said "Even the broadest reading of Roe, however, has not suggested that there is a constitutional right to abortion on demand. See, e. g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 189. Rather, the right protected by Roe is a right to decide to terminate a pregnancy free of undue interference by the State. Because the informed consent requirement facilitates the wise exercise of that right it cannot be classified as an interference with the right Roe protects. The informed consent requirement is not an undue burden on that right."

Evidence at trial demonstrated a litany of harms that present themselves to a woman where she is required by law to get the husband's consent as §3209 mandates. In striking down this provision the Court said "The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion. It does not merely make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain; for many women, it will impose a substantial obstacle. We must not blind ourselves to the fact that the significant number of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases"

O'Connor traced the legal history of marriage back to a time when women had no rights and were seen only as extensions of their husbands. She wrote "Section 3209 embodies a view of marriage consonant with the common law status of married women but repugnant to our present understanding of marriage and of the nature of the rights secured by the Constitution. Women do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they marry. The Constitution protects all individuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of governmental power, even where that power is employed for the supposed benefit of a member of the individual's family. These considerations confirm our conclusion that §3209 is invalid"

The Court rejected, again, the notion that parental consent violates a minor's rights under Roe where a judicial bypass is provided by the statute. The Court said "We have been over most of this ground before. Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure"

The Court affirmed part and invalidated part of the record keeping requirements of the Pennsylvania law. "Subsection (12) of the reporting provision requires the reporting of, among other things, a married woman's "reason for failure to provide notice" to her husband. § 3214(a)(12). This provision in effect requires women, as a condition of obtaining an abortion, to provide the Commonwealth with the precise information we have already recognized that many women have pressing reasons not to reveal. Like the spousal notice requirement itself, this provision places an undue burden on a woman's choice, and must be invalidated for that reason."

Associate Justice Stevens wrote an opinion which concurred in part and dissented in part. He was concerned that more clarification was needed to guide the States as to when their interest in maternal health and live childbirth could override the privacy interest of the woman to make the choice to terminate her pregnancy.  The counterpoise from the States' interest in potential life was the liberty interest of the mother.

Pennsylvania's Governor Robert P. Casey, Sr. depicted as a Pope

He was also concerned that State law reflected secular, avoiding any violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. "First, it is clear that, in order to be legitimate, the State's interest must be secular; consistent with the First Amendment the State may not promote a theological or sectarian interest."
Stevens rejects the Court's decisions in Akron and Thornburg He wrote "Those sections require a physician or counselor to provide the woman with a range of materials clearly designed to persuade her to choose not to undergo the abortion. While the State is free, pursuant to § 3208 of the Pennsylvania law, to produce and disseminate such material, the State may not inject such information into the woman's deliberations just as she is weighing such an important choice."

Associate Justice Blackmun, appreciative of the affirmation of the Court's decision in Roe, nevertheless expressed concern about the hostile judicial activism mounting on the Court to the landmark case. He wrote "I do not underestimate the significance of today's joint opinion. Yet I remain steadfast in my belief that the right to reproductive choice is entitled to the full protection afforded by this Court before Webster. And I fear for the darkness as four Justices anxiously await the single vote necessary to extinguish the light.

He continued " Make no mistake, the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter is an act of personal courage and constitutional principle. In contrast to previous decisions in which Justices O'Connor and Kennedy postponed reconsideration of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the authors of the joint opinion today join Justice Stevens and me in concluding that "the essential holding of Roe should be retained and once again reaffirmed." In brief, five Members of this Court today recognize that "the Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages."

Chief Justice Rehnquist, ironically anchored his rebuff of the Substantive Due Process Rights of a woman's liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the case of Bowers v. Hardwick. The Bowers case dealt with Georgia criminalizing sodomy; oral and anal sex between consenting adults. I say ironic because the Supreme Court managed to overrule Bowers seventeen years later in a similar case from Texas, Lawrence v. Texas. Rehnquist generally assails the majority in his somewhat rambling dissent.

Associate Justice Nino Scalia, in his dissent, said that he does not believe that our "Liberty" is not protected by the Constitution. "The issue is whether it is a liberty protected by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not. I reach that conclusion not because of anything so exalted as my views concerning the "concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Rather, I reach it for the same reason I reach the conclusion that bigamy is not constitutionally protected--because of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed."

Associate Justice Antonin Scalia

Apparently Nino Scalia has never read the Constitution which begins with the Preamble. "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

The Abortion Cases Part Ten

In Rust v. Sullivan the Supreme Court took a look at funds for Family Planning under Title X of the Public Health Service Act. The opinion of the Court was handed down by Chief Justice William Rehnquist. He was joined by Associate Justices Byron White, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and Nino Scalia.

Unlike their official portrait, the 1991 U.S. Supreme Court was sharply divided

Associate Justice Harry Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in which Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall joined and in which Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined as to Part I. Associate Justice John Paul Stevens joined Blackmun's opinion as to Parts II and III. Associate Justices Stevens and O'Connor filed separate dissenting opinions.

Facial challenges to a statute's constitutionality must demonstrate that the statute is constitutionally infirm as to any and all circumstances. A successful facial challenge to the constitutionality of a law renders that law void. Facial challenges are contrasted to "as applied" challenges which makes the case that the law as applied to a particular plaintiff or set of plaintiffs would be unconstitutional.

Rust v. Sullivan is a case about a facial challenge to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations limiting the ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the regulations, finding them to be a permissible construction of the statute as well as consistent with the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.

Here the majority affirms the Court of Appeals.

Congress enacted Title X of the Public Health Service Act (Act) providing for federal funding for family-planning services. The Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to "make grants to and enter into contracts with public or non-profit private entities to assist in the establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects which shall offer a broad range of acceptable and effective family planning methods and services." Grants and contracts under Title X must "be made in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary may promulgate." Section 1008 of the Act, however, provides that "[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." That restriction was intended to ensure that Title X funds would "be used only to support preventive family planning services, population research, infertility services, and other related medical, informational, and educational activities."

The regulations attach three principal conditions on the grant of federal funds for Title X projects. First, the regulations specify that a "Title X project may not provide counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family-planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of family planning."

Second, the regulations broadly prohibit a Title X project from engaging in activities that "encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of family planning." 59.10(a). Forbidden activities include lobbying for legislation that would increase the availability of abortion as a method of family planning, developing or disseminating materials advocating abortion as a method of family planning, providing speakers to promote abortion as a method of family planning, using legal action to make abortion available in any way as a method of family planning, and paying dues to any group that advocates abortion as a method of family planning as a substantial part of its activities.

Third, the regulations require that Title X projects be organized so that they are "physically and financially separate" from prohibited abortion activities.

Petitioners are Title X grantees and doctors who supervise Title X funds suing on behalf of themselves and their patients. Respondent is the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services.

The Court found the language of Title X ambiguous. We need not dwell on the plain language of the statute because we agree with every court to have addressed the issue that the language is ambiguous. The language of 1008 — that "[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning" — does not speak directly to the issues of counseling, referral, advocacy, or program integrity. If a statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."

Addressing "Program Integrity" Rehnquist said it was permissible for separate facilities and record keeping be maintained as a way to insure that federal funds were only used in a manner prescribed by the rules imposed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.

The Court's majority also rejected, by tiptoeing through a long line of cases, the argument that the rules advanced here violated the First Amendment. The opinion said "The regulations, which govern solely the scope of the Title X project's activities, do not in any way restrict the activities of those persons acting as private individuals. The employees' freedom of expression is limited during the time that they actually work for the project; but this limitation is a consequence of their decision to accept employment in a project, the scope of which is permissibly restricted by the funding authority"

Finally the Court summarily dismissed any claims predicated on denial of a woman's Due Process Rights under the Fifth Amendment. "Under the Secretary's regulations, however, a doctor's ability to provide, and a woman's right to receive, information concerning abortion and abortion-related services outside the context of the Title X project remains unfettered. It would undoubtedly be easier for a woman seeking an abortion if she could receive information about abortion from a Title X project, but the Constitution does not require that the Government distort the scope of its mandated program in order to provide that information."

The fact that this program was applicable to indigent women did not disturb the majority. "The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortion, but rather of her indigency."

Associate Justice Harry Blackmun's called the majority's opinion disingenuous. He said: "Because I conclude that a plainly constitutional construction of 1008 is not only `fairly possible' but entirely reasonable,' [he] would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this ground without deciding the constitutionality of the Secretary's Regulations"

Blackmun rejected the majority's analysis regarding the First Amendment and Fifth Amendment claims.

In the dissent by Associate Justice Stevens, he said: " I am convinced that the 1970 Act did not authorize the Secretary to censor the speech of grant recipients or their employees, I would hold the challenged regulations invalid and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals."

In her dissent Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said: " In this case, we need only tell the Secretary that his regulations are not a reasonable interpretation of the statute; we need not tell Congress that it cannot pass such legislation. If we rule solely on statutory grounds, Congress retains the power to force the constitutional question by legislating more explicitly. It may instead choose to do nothing. That decision should be left to Congress; we should not tell Congress what it cannot do before it has chosen to do it. It is enough in this case to conclude that neither the language nor the history of 1008 compels the Secretary's interpretation, and that the interpretation raises serious First Amendment concerns. On this basis alone, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and invalidate the challenged regulations.

Rust v. Sullivan was decided in 1991

The Abortion Cases Part Nine

Webster v. Reproductive Health Center primarily demonstrated that Roe v. Wade is on shaky grounds. The sixteen intervening years since Roe was handed down had not proved sufficient for the law to settle along the seismic fault lines between an individual's right to privacy and the States' interests in safeguarding and protecting potential human life.

The fractured nature of the opinion gives good indication that the Justices are not of one mind regarding the state of law on abortion. Here, only Part II-C is a unanimous opinion. The opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist.

Chief Justice William Rehnquist

The Court of Appeals invalidated the public funding portion of the Missouri Statute, §188.205. In Part II-C the Court addressed the threshold question "whether this provision reaches primary conduct, or whether it is simply an instruction to the State's fiscal officers not to allocate funds for abortion counseling" Two things happened here, first the State of Missouri argued that the statute applied only to "those persons responsible for expending public funds." The second thing was that the appellees withdrew their claim. Thus the issue was moot. Now, do you see why this part was unanimous?

Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy with respects to parts I, II-A, and II-B. Part I of the opinion dealt with a brief history of the case as it came to the Supreme Court.

Part II-A dealt with the statute's preamble. which says in pertinent part that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception," and that "[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and wellbeing." Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 1.205.1(1), (2) (1986). The Act then mandates that state laws be interpreted to provide unborn children with "all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state," subject to the Constitution and this Court's precedents. The Court of appeals invalidated the statute's preamble.

Rehnquist wrote In our view, the Court of Appeals misconceived the meaning of the Akron dictum, which was only that a State could not "justify" an abortion regulation otherwise invalid under Roe v. Wade on the ground that it embodied the State's view about when life begins. Certainly the preamble does not, by its terms, regulate abortion or any other aspect of appellees' medical practice. The Court has emphasized that Roe v. Wade "implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474. The preamble can be read simply to express that sort of value judgment.

Rehnquist deferred to Missouri State Courts to first apply the statute, and passed on finding whether or not the preamble was unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeals said that § 188.210 of the Missouri law "[i]t shall be unlawful for any public employee within the scope of his employment to perform or assist an abortion, not necessary to save the life of the mother," and § 188.215 making "unlawful for any public facility to be used for the purpose of performing or assisting an abortion not necessary to save the life of the mother" were contravened by the Supreme Court's prior decisions.

In Part II-B Rehnquist rules that the Court of Appeals sought to distinguish our cases on the additional ground that "[t]he evidence here showed that all of the public facility's costs in providing abortion services are recouped when the patient pays. Absent any expenditure of public funds, the court thought that Missouri was "expressing" more than "its preference for childbirth over abortions," but rather was creating an "obstacle to exercise of the right to choose an abortion [that could not] stand absent a compelling state interest." The opinion of this Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals.

Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined in Part II-D and III by Justices White and Kennedy.

In interpreting §188.029 Rehnquist, in Part II-D, believes that the Court of Appeals committed plain error by interpreting a statute' single sentence rather than construing the act as a whole.

That disputed part of Missouri's law provides that "[b]efore a physician performs an abortion on a woman he has reason to believe is carrying an unborn child of twenty or more weeks gestational age, the physician shall first determine if the unborn child is viable by using and exercising that degree of care, skill, and proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinarily skillful, careful, and prudent physician engaged in similar practice under the same or similar conditions. In making this determination of viability, the physician shall perform or cause to be performed such medical examinations and tests as are necessary to make a finding of the gestational age, weight, and lung maturity of the unborn child and shall enter such findings and determination of viability in the medical record of the mother."

Chief Justice Rehnquist said " We think that the doubt cast upon the Missouri statute by these cases is not so much a flaw in the statute as it is a reflection of the fact that the rigid trimester analysis of the course of a pregnancy enunciated in Roe has resulted in subsequent cases like Colautti and Akron making constitutional law in this area a virtual Procrustean bed." The Chief Justice used this opinion to attack the underpinning decision in Roe v. Wade.

As to the statute at hand the Chief Justice said "we are satisfied that the requirement of these tests permissibly furthers the State's interest in protecting potential human life, and we therefore believe § 188.029 to be constitutional."

Part III of the opinion goes to the heart of overturning Roe v. Wade. The Chief Justice said: "Both appellants and the United States as Amicus Curiae have urged that we overrule our decision in Roe v. Wade. The facts of the present case, however, differ from those at issue in Roe. Here, Missouri has determined that viability is the point at which its interest in potential human life must be safeguarded. In Roe, on the other hand, the Texas statute criminalized the performance of all abortions, except when the mother's life was at stake. This case therefore affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe, which was that the Texas statute unconstitutionally infringed the right to an abortion derived from the Due Process Clause, and we leave it undisturbed. To the extent indicated in our opinion, we would modify and narrow Roe and succeeding cases.

Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion in which she concurred in Parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-C of the Court's opinion and concur in the judgment as to Part II-D.

Associate Justice Nino Scalia

Associate Justice Nino Scalia filed an opinion concurring in Parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-C and agrees with Associate Justice Harry Blackmun's view that the plurality's opinion would effectively overrule Roe v. Wade. Justice Scalia clearly states that he would overrule Roe v. Wade.

Associate Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred. This opinion is a scathing attack on the plurality.

Blackmun wrote that never in his "memory has a plurality gone about its business in such a deceptive fashion. At every level of its review, from its effort to read the real meaning out of the Missouri statute to its intended evisceration of precedents and its deafening silence about the constitutional protections that it would jettison, the plurality obscures the portent of its analysis. With feigned restraint, the plurality announces that its analysis leaves Roe "undisturbed," albeit "modif[ied] and narrow[ed]." But this disclaimer is totally meaningless. The plurality opinion is filled with winks, and nods, and knowing glances to those who would do away with Roe explicitly, but turns a stone face to anyone in search of what the plurality conceives as the scope of a woman's right under the Due Process Clause to terminate a pregnancy free from the coercive and brooding influence of the State. The simple truth is that Roe would not survive the plurality's analysis, and that the plurality provides no substitute for Roe's protective umbrella."

Associate Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Stevens rightly positions the argument regarding the Missouri statute's preamble in light of being in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.

Justice Blackmun said:" In my opinion, the preamble to the Missouri statute is unconstitutional for two reasons. To the extent that it has substantive impact on the freedom to use contraceptive procedures, it is inconsistent with the central holding in Griswold. To the extent that it merely makes "legislative findings without operative effect," as the State argues, it violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Contrary to the theological "finding" of the Missouri Legislature, a woman's constitutionally protected liberty encompasses the right to act on her own belief that -- to paraphrase St. Thomas Aquinas -- until a seed has acquired the powers of sensation and movement, the life of a human being has not yet begun."

Webster v. Reproductive Health Center was decided in 1989.

The Abortion Cases Part Seven

In Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft a sharply divided Court struck down part of a Missouri statute while upholding other sections of the law. This is another opinion by Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell. Well, he wrote Parts I & II of the opinion, he was joined in the balance by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger

The parts of the Missouri statute being scrutinized were §188.025 requiring abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy to be performed in a hospital; §188.047 mandating a pathology report for each abortion performed; §188.030.3 mandating the presence of a second physician in post viability abortions; and §188.028 requiring minors to have either parental consent or consent of the Juvenile Court prior to abortions being performed on them.

The provision requiring second trimester abortions to be performed only in hospitals was struck down, as it was in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health. Thus §188.025 unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion."

The Court noted that "[p]reserving the life of a viable fetus that is aborted may not often be possible, but the State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the comparatively few instances of live birth that occur." The Court found that the second-physician requirement of §188.030.3 "reasonably furthers the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses" and found the section to be Constitutionally permissible.

The Court found the requirement of a pathology report, §188.047, to have a relatively insignificant burden on the right of a woman to procure an abortion. This section was upheld.

Relying on the reasoning from the Bellotti case the Court found the Missouri parental consent form, §188.028, valid because a Missouri Court would have to find good cause, supported by required evidence that the minor was not mature enough to make her own decisions in order to deny a minor's request for judicial consent for an abortion.

Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Associate Justices White and Rehnquist found  the second-physician requirement of 188.030.3 is constitutional because the State has a compelling interest, extant throughout pregnancy, in protecting and preserving fetal life; The pathology-report requirement of 188.047 is constitutional because it imposes no undue burden on the limited right to undergo an abortion, and its validity is not contingent on the trimester of pregnancy in which it is imposed; and Assuming, arguendo, that the State cannot impose a parental veto on a minor's decision to undergo an abortion, the parental consent provision of 188.028.2 is constitutional because it imposes no undue burden on any right that a minor may have to undergo an abortion.

Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft was decided in 1983.

Next came a rare 8 to 1 decision rendered by Justice Powell, in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined. Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined in Parts I and II of Powell's opinion. Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which was joined by Justices White and Rehnquist. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion

Virginia had passed a law requiring second trimester abortions to be performed at a hospital. Differing from Missouri in Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft and Ohio in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, the Virginia statute licensed outpatient surgical centers as hospitals.

Powell's opinion in Simopoulos v. Virginia held that Virginia's requirement that second trimester abortions be performed in hospitals is not an unreasonable means of furthering the State's important and legitimate interest in protecting the woman's health, which interest becomes "compelling" at approximately the end of the first trimester.

The Missouri and Ohio statutes required abortions to be performed at general acute-care facilities. Because Virginia law permits abortions to be performed in licensed outpatient clinics City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health and Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft do not control the outcome of this case.

Although a State's discretion in determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities does not permit it to adopt abortion regulations departing  from accepted medical practice, the Virginia regulations on their face are compatible with accepted medical standards governing outpatient second trimester abortions.

Simopoulos v. Virginia was decided in 1983.

The Abortion Cases Part Six

Akron, Ohio, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, passed an ordinance regulating abortions. The majority opinion was written by Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell. The Court reaffirmed that the "State's interest in health regulation becomes compelling at approximately the end of the first trimester. The existence of a compelling state interest in health, however, is only the beginning of the inquiry. The State's regulation may be upheld only if it is reasonably designed to further that state interest." Further, "the State is obligated to make a reasonable effort to limit the effect of its regulations to the period in the trimester during which its health interest will be furthered."

The Court considered these aspects of the Akron ordinance:

(i) Section 1870.03 requires that all abortions performed after the first trimester of pregnancy be performed in a hospital

(ii) Section 1870.05 sets forth requirements for notification of and consent by parents before abortions may be performed on unmarried minors.

(iii) Section 1870.06 requires that the attending physician make certain specified statements to the patient "to insure that the consent for an abortion is truly informed consent."

(iv) Section 1870.07 requires a 24-hour waiting period between the time the woman signs a consent form and the time the abortion is performed.

(v) Section 1870.16 requires that fetal remains be "disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner."

The portion of the Akron ordinance requiring second trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital, §1870.03, was invalidated because the requirement placed an impermissible obstacle in the path of women seeking abortions. This unreasonably impinged on a woman's Constitutionally protected right to terminate pregnancy.

The Court invalidated the parental notification section of the Akron ordinance, §1870.05. This section imposed a blanket requirement, without regard for the maturity of the minor to make the decision for herself. The ordinance lacked alternative measures required by Bellotti. Stay tuned, this won't be the last case for the City Akron regarding parental notification

The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in finding Constitutionally infirm that the portion of the ordinance, §1870.06 (b), where the physician was required to inform the mother that unborn child is a human child from the moment of conception. This requirement was "inconsistent with the Court's holding in Roe v. Wade that a State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of abortions."

Then the Court affirmed the validity of §1870.06 (c), the portion of the ordinance where the information regarding the risks of the procedure, and shared medical judgments regarding the decision to abort or carry the fetus to term. The section was struck down because it did not permit anyone other than the physician to communicate this information to the patient.

The 24 hour waiting period was struck down as being arbitrary. Powell said that "[i]n accordance with the ethical standards of the profession, a physician will advise the patient to defer the abortion when he thinks this will be beneficial to her. But if a woman, after appropriate counseling, is prepared to give her written informed consent and proceed with the abortion, a State may not demand that she delay the effectuation of that decision."

The Court struck down as impermissibly vague §1870.16 requiring humane disposition of fetal remains. What humane meant was important because failure to comply triggered a criminal sanction. Were the physicians required to provide for embryonic funerals? The Court said that before conduct is criminalized, the actus reus or the criminal act must be set forth specifically.

Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor

Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion She addressed the self collapsing nature of the decision in Roe v. Wade. The three trimester stages designated under Roe was unworkable because advances in science kept moving back the viability date where the fetus could survive ex utereo. These advancements kept moving back to the date where the states' interest in preserving human life attached.

Justice O'Connor's opinion would replace the trimester test with the unduly burdensome standard the Court used in Maher v. Roe. Here the Court rules that it has an interest in maternal health as well as in potential human life. O'Connor says " the point at which these interests become compelling does not depend on the trimester of pregnancy. Rather, these interests are present throughout pregnancy."

Not every statutory scheme or regulation need be examined under strict scrutiny employing the compelling state interest test with its requirement that the state action be narrowly tailored. Rather, as the Court had ruled in Carey v. Population Services, a case about contraceptives, "It was necessary that the state law impose a significant burden on a protected right, or that it burden an individual's right to decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision."

O'Connor said "the Court recognizes that even a "significant obstacle" can be justified by a "reasonable" regulation." She goes on to say " The "undue burden" required in the abortion cases represents the required threshold inquiry that must be conducted before this Court can require a State to justify its legislative actions under the exacting "compelling state interest" standard."

City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health was decided in 1983.