USA v. ARIZONA - THE SB1070 CASE ON APPEAL - PART TWO

Judge Paez's section by section analysis of the enjoined sections of Arizona's SB 1070 began with section 2(b).

S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) provides, in the first sentence, that when officers have reasonable suspicion that someone they have lawfully stopped, detained, or arrested is an unauthorized immigrant, they “shall” make “a reasonable attempt . . .when practicable, to determine the immigration status” of the person. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2010).

Section 2(B)’s second and third sentences provide that “any person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before the person is released,” and “the person’s immigration status shall be verified with the federal government.” 

The Section’s fifth sentence states that a “person is presumed to not be an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States if the person provides” a form of identification included in a prescribed list.

Arizona argues that its officers are only required to verify the immigration status of an arrested person before release if reasonable suspicion exists that the person lacks proper documentation. Paez refutes Arizona's argument by employing statutory analysis.

On its face, Paez writes, the text does not support Arizona’s reading of Section 2(B). The second sentence is unambiguous: “Any person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before the person is released.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2010). 

The all encompassing “any person,” the mandatory “shall,” and the definite “determined,” make this provision incompatible with the first sentence’s qualified “reasonable attempt . . . when practicable,” and qualified “reasonable suspicion.” In addition, the opinion says, Arizona’s reading creates irreconcilable confusion as to the meaning of the third and fifth sentences.

The Ninth Circuit agrees with the district court that the reasonable suspicion requirement in the first sentence does not modify the plain meaning of the second sentence. Thus, Section 2(B) requires officers to verify — with the federal government — the immigration status of all arrestees before they are released, regardless of whether or not reasonable suspicion exists that the arrestee is an undocumented immigrant.

The Ninth Circuit is required to determine the purpose of Congress and then determine if the Congress legislated in an area typically and traditionally occupied by the States. The Ninth Circuit concluded that The states have not traditionally occupied the field of identifying immigration violations so they did not apply a presumption against preemption for Section 2(B).

Paez began his inquiry into Congressional purpose by focusing on 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) of the INA. That section is titled "Performance of immigration officer functions by State officers and employees.”

Congress, Paez says, has instructed under what conditions state officials are permitted to assist the Executive in the enforcement of immigration laws. Congress has provided that the Attorney General “may enter into a written agreement with a State . . . pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State . . . who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States . . . may carry out such function.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1). Subsection (g)(3) provides that “in performing a function under this subsection, an officer . . . of a State . . . shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3). Subsection (g)(5) requires that the written agreement must specify “the specific powers and duties that may be, or are required to be, exercised or performed by the individual, the duration of the authority of the individual, and the position of the agency of the Attorney General who is required to supervise and direct the individual .”

The provisions of the INA, according to Paez, demonstrate that Congress intended for states to be involved in the enforcement of immigration laws under the Attorney General’s close supervision. Not only must the Attorney General approve of each individual state officer, he or she must delineate which functions each individual officer is permitted to perform.

The Court of Appeals interprets subsection (g)(10)(B) to mean that when the Attorney General calls upon state and local law enforcement officers—or such officers are confronted with the necessity—to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement on an incidental and as needed basis, state and local officers are permitted to provide this cooperative help without the written agreements that are required for systematic and routine cooperation.

Similarly, the Court of Appeals interprets subsection (g)(10)(A) to mean that state officers can communicate with the Attorney General about immigration status information that they obtain or need in the performance of their regular state duties. But subsection (g)(10)(A) does not permit states to adopt laws dictating how and when state and local officers must communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of an individual. Subsection (g)(10) does not exist in a vacuum, Paez writes; Congress enacted it alongside subsections (g)(1)-(9) and we therefore interpret subsection (g)(10) as part of a whole, not as an isolated provision with a meaning that is unencumbered by the other constituent parts of § 1357(g).9

Delivering the bottom line Paez writes that in sum, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) demonstrates that Congress intended for state officers to systematically aid in immigration enforcement only under the close supervision of the Attorney General — to whom Congress granted discretion in determining the precise conditions and direction of each state officer’s assistance.

The Court of Appeals found it particularly significant for the purposes of the present case that this discretion includes the Attorney General’s ability to make an individual officer’s immigration enforcement duties permissive or mandatory. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(5).

Arizona's SB1070 Section 2(B) sidesteps Congress’ scheme for permitting the states to assist the federal government with immigration enforcement. Through Section 2(B), Arizona has enacted a mandatory and systematic scheme that conflicts with Congress’ explicit requirement that in the “performance of immigration officer functions by State officers and employees,” such officers “shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3). Section 2(B) therefore interferes with Congress’ scheme because Arizona has assumed a role in directing its officers how to enforce the INA.

The Court of Appeals is not aware of any INA provision demonstrating that Congress intended to permit states to usurp the Attorney General’s role in directing state enforcement of federal immigration laws.

Arizona argues that in another INA provision, “Congress has expressed a clear intent to encourage the assistance from state and local law enforcement officers,” citing 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). That section, Paez writes, creates an obligation, on the part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to “respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual . . . for any purpose authorized by law.”

The Court of Appeals agree that § 1373(c) demonstrates that Congress contemplated state assistance in the identification of undocumented immigrants. We add, however, that Congress contemplated this assistance within the boundaries established in § 1357(g), not in a manner dictated by a state law that furthers a state immigration policy.

The Heart of the Ruling

The Ninth Circuit finds ample rationale for applying the federal preemption doctrine. Paez writes that by imposing mandatory obligations on state and local officers, Arizona interferes with the federal government’s authority to implement its priorities and strategies in law enforcement, turning Arizona officers into state-directed DHS agents. As a result, Section 2(B) interferes with Congress’ delegation of discretion to the Executive branch in enforcing the INA.

S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” as expressed in the aforementioned INA provisions. The law subverts Congress’ intent that systematic state immigration enforcement will occur under the direction and close supervision of the Attorney General. Furthermore, the mandatory nature of Section 2(B)’s immigration status checks is inconsistent with the discretion Congress vested in the Attorney General to supervise and direct State officers in their immigration work according to federally-determined priorities.

In addition to Section 2(B) standing as an obstacle to Congress’ statutorily expressed intent, the record unmistakably demonstrates that S.B. 1070 has had a deleterious effect on the United States’ foreign relations, which weighs in favor of preemption. See generally Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (finding obstacle preemption where a State law impinged on the Executive’s authority to singularly control foreign affairs); Crosby, 530 U.S. 363 (same). In Garamendi, the Court stated that “even . . . the likelihood that state legislation will produce something more than incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the National government would require preemption of the state law.”

Actual Foreign Policy Problems

The record before this court demonstrates that S.B. 1070 does not threaten a “likelihood . . . [of] producing] something more than incidental effect;” rather, Arizona’s law has created actual foreign policy problems of a magnitude far greater than incidental. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 (emphasis added). Thus far, the following foreign leaders and bodies have publicly criticized Arizona’s law: The Presidents of Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala; the governments of Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and Nicaragua; the national assemblies in Ecuador and Nicaragua and the Central American Parliament; six human rights experts at the United Nations; the Secretary General and many permanent representatives of the Organization of American States; the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; and the Union of South American Nations.

In addition to criticizing S.B. 1070, Mexico has taken affirmative steps to protest it. As a direct result of the Arizona law, at least five of the six Mexican Governors invited to travel to Phoenix to participate in the September 8-10, 2010 U.S. - Mexico Border Governors’ Conference declined the invitation. The Mexican Senate has postponed review of a U.S.-Mexico agreement on emergency management cooperation to deal with natural disasters.

Relying on the record, and testimony from Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg, the Ninth Circuit found that these factors persuade us that Section 2(B) thwarts the Executive’s ability to singularly manage the spillover effects of the nation’s immigration laws on foreign affairs.

Finally, Paez writes, the threat of 50 states layering their own immigration enforcement rules on top of the INA also weighs in favor of preemption. The Court of Appeals cites Hines v. Davidowitz on this point:

The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective

interests of the forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and exclusive

responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties.

“For local interests the several states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.” Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the United States has met its burden to show that there is likely no set of circumstances under which S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) would be valid, and it is likely to succeed on the merits of its challenge. That's the inconceivable standard, it is inconceivable that any application of SB 1070 passes Constitutional muster. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding the same.

Part Three of this series will focus on Judge Paez's analysis of Section 3 of SB1070.