(1) misconstruing well-established principles of federal preemption law;
(2) disregarding its obligation to preserve the constitutionality of the Act’s provisions and to presume that Arizona will implement the provisions in a constitutional manner; and
(3) ignoring the United States’ burden on a facial challenge to show that the provisions of S.B. 1070 are unconstitutional in all of their applications... Instead, the district court granted the United States’ request for the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief by accepting the United States’ speculation regarding the potential burden that enforcing sections 2(B), 3, 5(C), and 6 might impose on narrow categories of lawfully-present aliens in hypothetical and speculative scenarios, and the possible impact to DHS’s achievement of its newly-established objective, [emphasis by Appellants].
1. With respect to the district court’s finding that the United States is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims that sections 2(B), 3, 5(C), and 6 are facially preempted, the issues presented are:
a. Whether the United States can demonstrate that section 2(B) is facially preempted based on the potential that enforcement of section 2(B) could burden certain lawfully-present aliens or federal resources, even though section 2(B) merely asks Arizona’s law enforcement officers to exchange information with ICE that Congress has expressly required ICE to receive and provide.
b. Whether section 3 stands as an obstacle to the achievement of current congressional objectives by mandating compliance with two specific federal immigration registration laws.
c. Whether Congress’ decision not to impose sanctions on employees who perform unauthorized work reflects a “clear and manifest” intent to prohibit states from doing so.
d. Whether the warrantless arrest provision in section 6 can be facially preempted based on speculation that Arizona’s law enforcement officersmight implement it in an unconstitutional manner.
2. With respect to the district court’s finding as to the non-merits factors, the sole issue presented is whether it is in the public interest to prohibit Arizona from acting consistently with congressional objectives to address “the rampant illegal immigration, escalating drug and human trafficking crimes, and serious public safety concerns” that the federal government has admittedly failed to address authoritatively.
Whether the district court abused its discretion in preliminarily enjoining four provisions of an Arizona law that establish a nondiscretionary state immigration enforcement scheme that is not subject to the control or priorities of federal immigration authorities, and which
(1) makes it a state crime for an alien to violate provisions of federal law that require some aliens to complete and carry federal registration documentation;
(2) makes it a state crime for an unauthorized alien to seek or obtain employment;
(3) mandates all state and local officers to determine, as practicable, the immigration status of persons whom they stop or detain if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is an alien and unlawfully present in the United States, and to verify the immigration status of all persons arrested before they are released; and
(4) authorizes state officers to arrest without a warrant any person, including those who are lawfully present in the United States, when the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has at some point committed an offense that makes the person removable from the United States.
The United States is arguing that Judge Bolton did not abuse her discretion when she issued her Order and Preliminary Injunction. The United States' position is that Congress has "established a comprehensive framework that governs entrance and admission into the United States by foreign nationals, the consequences of illegal entry, and the procedures for removal and deportation of aliens from this country. Congress has also comprehensively regulated the employment of persons unlawfully present in the United States, and imposed a calibrated scale of civil and criminal penalties on employers who knowingly hire such persons, but declined to impose criminal penalties on such persons who seek or obtain employment."